Jack Robles

Personal Details

First Name:	Jack
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Robles
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pro494
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Terminal Degree:	1996 Rady School of Management; University of California-San Diego (UCSD) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

School of Economics and Finance
Wellington School of Business and Government
Victoria University of Wellington

Wellington, New Zealand
https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/business/academic-areas/economics-and-finance
RePEc:edi:egvuwnz (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Ignatius J. Horstmann & James R. Markusen & Jack Robles, 2001. "Multi-Issue Bargaining and Linked Agendas: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain," NBER Working Papers 8347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

   Cited by:

   1. Drusilla K. Brown & Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M Stern, 2002. "Pros and Cons of Linking Trade and Labor Standards," Working Papers 477, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
      • Drusilla K. Brown & Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, 2009. "Pros and Cons of Linking Trade and Labor Standards," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Globalization And International Trade Policies, chapter 16, pages 599-621, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
      • Drusilla K. Brown & Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, 2004. "Pros and Cons of Linking Trade and Labor Standards," Contributions to Economic Analysis, in: The Political Economy of Policy Reform: Essays in Honor of J. Michael Finger, pages 25-42, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
   2. Limao, Nuno, 2005. "Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 175-199, September.
      • Nuno Limão, 2018. "Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements, chapter 9, pages 257-281, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
      • Nuno Limão, 2002. "Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?," International Trade 0206002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Jul 2002.
   3. Markusen, James R., 2012. "Per-Capita Income as a Determinant of International Trade and Environmental Policies," Discussion Papers 2013-06, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
      • James R. Markusen, 2013. "Per-capita Income as a Determinant of International Trade and Environmental Policies," NBER Working Papers 19754, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
      • Markusen, James, 2014. "Per-Capita Income as a Determinant of International Trade and Environmental Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 9799, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   4. James R. Markusen, 2014. "Per-Capital Income as a Determinant of International Trade and Environment Policies," CESifo Working Paper Series 4618, CESifo.
   5. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2003. "International agreements on product standard: an incomplete contracting theory," NBER Working Papers 9533, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
      • Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2003. "International agreements on product standards: an incomplete-contracting theory," Working Papers 229, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
   6. Hirbod Assa & Sheridon Elliston & Ehud Lehrer, 2016. "Joint games and compatibility," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 91-113, January.
   7. Rauscher, Michael, 2001. "International trade, foreign investment, and the environment," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 29, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.

2. Tore Ellingsen & Jack Robles, 2000. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-up Problem," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1525, Econometric Society.
   • Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2002. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 28-53, April.
   • Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2000. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-up Problem?," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 358, Stockholm School of Economics.

   Cited by:

   1. Olcina Vauteren Gonzalo & Calabuig Alcántara Vicente, 2007. "Cooperation and Cultural Transmission in a Coordination Game," Working Papers 201066, Fundacion BBVA / BBVA Foundation.
      • Vicente Calabuig & Gonzalo Olcina, 2009. "Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game," Post-Print hal-00698840, HAL.
      • Calabuig, Vicente & Olcina, Gonzalo, 2009. "Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 188-201, October.
   2. Kurtis Swope & Pamela Schmitt & John Cadigan & Ryan Wielgus, 2010. "Contracts, Behavior, and the Land-Assembly Problem:An Experimental Study," Departmental Working Papers 29, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
      • Kurtis Swope & Ryan Wielgus & Pamela Schmitt & John Cadigan, 2011. "Contracts, Behavior, and the Land-assembly Problem: An Experimental Study," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments on Energy, the Environment, and Sustainability, pages 151-180, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
   3. Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
      • Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1888, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
      • Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000676, David K. Levine.
   4. Dawid, Herbert & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2008. "Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 26-52, January.
   5. Christian Ewerhart, "undated". "The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Outcome of Alternating-Offers Bargaining between Inequity-Averse Agents," IEW - Working Papers 203, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
      • Christian Ewerhart, 2006. "The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Outcome of Alternating-Offers Bargaining Between Inequity-Averse Agents," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 58(2), pages 184-203, April.
   6. Luciano Andreozzi, 2008. "Property Rights and Investments: An Evolutionary Approach," Department of Economics Working Papers 0822, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
      • Andreozzi, Luciano, 2012. "Property rights and investments: An evolutionary approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 1-11.
   7. Jeffrey P. Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2013. "Crying Over Spilt Milk: Sunk Costs, Fairness Norms and the Hold-up Problem," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 1(2), pages 113-129, December.
      • Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2003. "Crying Over Spilt Milk: Sunk Costs, Fairness Norms and the Hold-Up Problem," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0312, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
   8. Pitchford, Rohan & Snyder, Christopher M., 2004. "A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 88-103, January.
   9. Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2005. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 57, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   10. Birendra K. Rai, 2006. "Evolution of Division Rules," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-27, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
   11. Troger, Thomas, 2002. "Double Auctions, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, and the Hold-Up Problem," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt5qv060md, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
   12. Robles, Jack, 2001. "Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 312-330, February.
   13. Benndorf, Volker & Martínez-Martínez, Ismael & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2021. "Games with coupled populations: An experiment in continuous time," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
   14. L. Bagnoli & G. Negroni, 2012. "On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies," Working Papers wp858, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
   15. Herbert Dawid & Joern Dermietzel, 2006. "How Robust is the Equal Split Norm? Responsive Strategies, Selection Mechanisms and the Need for Economic Interpretation of Simulation Parameters," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(4), pages 371-397, November.
   16. Sawa, Ryoji, 2021. "A prospect theory Nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 692-711.
   17. Andreozzi, Luciano, 2010. "An evolutionary theory of social justice: Choosing the right game," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 320-329, September.
   18. Deltas, George, 2006. "Overinvestment in partially relationship-specific assets and R&D," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 466-475, July.
   19. Olcina, Gonzalo & Penarrubia, Concepcion, 2004. "Hold up and intergenerational transmission of preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 111-132, May.
   20. Troger, Thomas, 2002. "Double Auctions, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, and the Hold-Up Problem," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt3f2509gz, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
   21. Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2005. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Papers in Economics 518, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
   22. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2017. "Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 12540, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   23. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2000. "Is There a Hold-up Problem?," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 357, Stockholm School of Economics.
       • Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2004. "Is There a Hold‐up Problem?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 475-494, October.
   24. Kevin Hasker, 2014. "The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000954, David K. Levine.
   25. Fabrizio Panebianco, 2016. "The role of persuasion in cultural evolution dynamics," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 63(3), pages 233-258, September.
   26. Giorgio Negroni & Lidia Bagnoli, 2017. "On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 12(3), pages 635-667, October.
   27. Bahry, Donna L. & Wilson, Rick K., 2006. "Confusion or fairness in the field? Rejections in the ultimatum game under the strategy method," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 37-54, May.
   28. L. Bagnoli & G. Negroni, 2013. "Egalitarianism. An evolutionary perspective," Working Papers wp888, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

Articles

1. Robles Jack & Shimoji Makoto, 2012. "On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-21, May.

   Cited by:

   1. Bernhard Kasberger & Karl H. Schlag, 2024. "Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid Without Knowing What Others Are Doing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(7), pages 4219-4235, July.
      • Bernhard Kasberger & Karl H. Schlag, 2017. "Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid without Knowing what Otheres are Doing," Vienna Economics Papers vie1707, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
   2. Makoto Shimoji, 2017. "Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(4), pages 231-252, December.
      • Makoto Shimoji, 2014. "Revenue Comparison of Discrete Private-Value Auctions via Weak Dominance," Discussion Papers 14/13, Department of Economics, University of York.
   3. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
      • Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015. "Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.

2. Jack Robles, 2011. "Demand growth and strategically useful idle capacity," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(4), pages 767-786, December.

   Cited by:

   1. Huberts, N.F.D. & Dawid, H. & Huisman, K.J.M. & Kort, P.M., 2019. "Entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 274(1), pages 165-185.
   2. Yang, Qing & Zhang, Lei & Zhang, Jinsuo & Zou, Shaohui, 2021. "System simulation and policy optimization of China's coal production capacity deviation in terms of the economy, environment, and energy security," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
   3. Aniruddha Bagchi & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: an old debate with a new look," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(2), pages 133-147, June.

3. Jack Robles, 2008. "Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(1), pages 19-36, April.

   Cited by:

   1. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Nick Netzer, 2015. "Robust stochastic stability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 31-57, January.
      • Carlos Alós–Ferrer & Nick Netzer, 2012. "Robust stochastic stability," ECON - Working Papers 063, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jan 2014.
   2. David Malueg, 2010. "Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash Demand Game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(2), pages 243-270, August.
   3. Kevin Hasker, 2014. "The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000954, David K. Levine.

4. Li, Changying & Robles, Jack, 2007. "Product innovation and parallel trade," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 417-429, April.

   Cited by:

   1. Hwang, Hong & Peng, Cheng-Hau & Shih, Pei-Cyuan, 2014. "Parallel imports, product innovation and market structures," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 237-245.
   2. Giorgio Matteucci & Pierfrancesco Reverberi, 2011. "Parallel trade and its impact on incentives to invest in product quality," DIS Technical Reports 2011-05, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
   3. Frank Mueller‐Langer, 2012. "Parallel Trade and its Ambiguous Effects on Global Welfare," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 177-185, February.
   4. Kamal Saggi, 2016. "Trade, Intellectual Property Rights, and the World Trade Organization," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00014, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
   5. Changying Li, 2005. "Vertical Product Innovation And Parallel Imports," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 50(01), pages 35-46.
   6. Romana L. Autrey & Francesco Bova & David A. Soberman, 2014. "Organizational Structure and Gray Markets," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(6), pages 849-870, November.
   7. Giorgio Gnecco & Berna Tuncay & Fabio Pammolli, 2018. "A Comparison of Game-Theoretic Models for Parallel Trade," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(03), pages 1-57, September.
   8. Mueller-Langer, Frank, 2010. "An analysis of the ambiguous welfare effects of parallel trade freedom," MPRA Paper 35704, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   9. Li, Hai & Shao, Jing & Zhu, Stuart X., 2018. "Parallel importation in a supply Chain: The impact of gray market structure," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 220-241.
   10. Eric W. Bond & Kamal Saggi, 2023. "Patent protection in developing countries and global welfare: WTO obligations versus flexibilities," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kamal Saggi (ed.), Technology Transfer, Foreign Direct Investment, and the Protection of Intellectual Property in the Global Economy, chapter 22, pages 505-520, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
       • Bond, Eric W. & Saggi, Kamal, 2020. "Patent protection in developing countries and global welfare: WTO obligations versus flexibilities," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
   11. Aneta Karasek & Valerij Dermol, 2015. "The Creative Class in Poland and Its Impact on Innovation in Polish Regions," Management, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper, vol. 10(4), pages 299-314.
   12. Shen Guo & Bin Hu & Hai Zhong, 2013. "Impact of parallel trade on pharmaceutical firm’s profits: rise or fall?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 14(2), pages 345-355, April.
   13. Hai Li & Stuart X. Zhu & Nanfang Cui & Jianbin Li, 2016. "Analysis of gray markets in differentiated duopoly," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(13), pages 4008-4027, July.
   14. Olena Ivus & Edwin L.-C. Lai, 2017. "Patent Exhaustion Regime and International Production Sharing: Winner and Losers?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6644, CESifo.
   15. Hamelmann, Lisa & Klein, Gordon J., 2017. "Removing geo-blocking: What are the effects on innovation for vertically differentiated goods?," CAWM Discussion Papers 100, University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP).

5. Ignatius J. Horstmann & James R. Markusen & Jack Robles, 2005. "Issue Linking in Trade Negotiations: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 185-204, May.

   Cited by:

   1. Currarini, S. & Marchiori, C., 2022. "Issue linkage," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 16-40.
   2. Bård Harstad, 2018. "Pledge-and-Review Bargaining," CESifo Working Paper Series 7296, CESifo.
      • Harstad, Bård, 2023. "Pledge-and-review bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
   3. Harstad, Bård, 2021. "A Theory of Pledge-and-Review Bargaining," Memorandum 5/2022, Oslo University, Department of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2021.
   4. Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, 2014. "Multilateral environmental agreements in the WTO: Silence speaks volumes," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 10(1), pages 147-166, March.
      • Horn, Henrik & Mavroides, Petros C., 2013. "Multilateral Environmental Agreements in the WTO: Silence Speaks Volumes," Working Paper Series 983, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
   5. Barbara Dluhosch & Nikolai Ziegler, 2011. "The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 325-354, December.
   6. Dapeng Cai & Jie Li, 2012. "Quid pro quo and the enforcement of intellectual property rights protection: A bargaining approach," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(6), pages 755-772, December.
   7. Adib Bagh & Josh Ederington, 2024. "Equity‐efficiency tradeoffs in international bargaining," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(2), pages 782-804, April.
   8. Bård Harstad, 2022. "Trade, Trees, and Contingent Trade Agreements," CESifo Working Paper Series 9596, CESifo.
   9. Bård Harstad, 2020. "Trade and Trees: How Trade Agreements Can Motivate Conservation Instead of Depletion," CESifo Working Paper Series 8569, CESifo.
   10. Johanna Goertz, 2011. "Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 547-563, April.

6. Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2002. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 28-53, April.
   • Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2000. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-up Problem?," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 358, Stockholm School of Economics.
   • Tore Ellingsen & Jack Robles, 2000. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-up Problem," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1525, Econometric Society.
   See citations under working paper version above.
7. Robles, Jack, 2001. "Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 312-330, February.

   Cited by:

   1. Shota Fujishima, 2015. "The emergence of cooperation through leadership," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 17-36, February.
   2. Robles Jack, 2011. "Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-24, April.
   3. Jack Robles, 2008. "Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(1), pages 19-36, April.

8. Robles, Jack, 1998. "Evolution with Changing Mutation Rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 207-223, April.

   Cited by:

   1. van Damme, E.E.C. & Weibull, J., 2002. "Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities," Other publications TiSEM 1c779ce9-9daa-4893-9ddb-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • van Damme, Eric & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2002. "Evolution in Games with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 296-315, October.
   2. Murat Yildizoglu & Nicolas Carayol & Pascale Roux, 2008. "Inefficiencies in a model of spatial networks formation with positive externalities," Post-Print hal-00401137, HAL.
      • Nicolas Carayol & Pascale Roux & Murat Yildizoğlu, 2008. "Inefficiencies in a model of spatial networks formation with positive externalities," Post-Print hal-00279259, HAL.
      • Carayol, Nicolas & Roux, Pascale & YIldIzoGlu, Murat, 2008. "Inefficiencies in a model of spatial networks formation with positive externalities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 495-511, August.
   3. van Damme, E.E.C. & Weibull, J., 1999. "Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities," Discussion Paper 1999-122, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
      • van Damme, Eric & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1999. "Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities," Working Paper Series 525, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
      • van Damme, E.E.C. & Weibull, J., 1999. "Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities," Other publications TiSEM 3d223895-7f20-4e8e-aa9c-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   4. Pak, Maxwell, 2008. "Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 650-665, November.
   5. Pascale Roux & Nicolas Carayol, 2009. "Knowledge flows and the geography of networks. A strategic model of small world formation," Post-Print hal-00390685, HAL.
      • Nicolas Carayol & Pascale Roux, 2006. "Knowledge flows and the geography of networks. A strategic model of small worlds formation," Working Papers of BETA 2006-16, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
      • Nicolas Carayol & Pascale Roux, 2009. "Knowledge Flows and the Geography of Networks. A Strategic Model of Small World Formation," Post-Print hal-00674100, HAL.
      • Carayol, Nicolas & Roux, Pascale, 2009. "Knowledge flows and the geography of networks: A strategic model of small world formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 414-427, August.
      • Pascale Roux & Nicolas Carayol, 2007. "Knowledge flows and the geography of networks : a strategic model of small world formation," Post-Print hal-00390735, HAL.
   6. Eric Van Damme & Jorgen W Weibull, 1999. "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2113, David K. Levine.
      • Weibull, Jörgen W. & van Damme, Eric, 1998. "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Working Paper Series 501, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
      • van Damme, E.E.C. & Weibull, J., 1998. "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Discussion Paper 1998-94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
      • van Damme, E.E.C. & Weibull, J., 1998. "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Other publications TiSEM 197ad72d-2cb6-49c3-a875-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   7. Katsuhiko Aiba, 2015. "Waiting times in evolutionary dynamics with time-decreasing noise," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 499-514, May.
   8. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Yunshyong Chow & Li-Chau Wu, 2013. "Imitation, local interaction, and coordination," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 1041-1057, November.
   9. Lim, Wooyoung & Neary, Philip R., 2016. "An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 208-219.

9. Robles, Jack, 1997. "Evolution and Long Run Equilibria in Coordination Games with Summary Statistic Payoff Technologies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 180-193, July.

   Cited by:

   1. Bagnoli, Lidia & Negroni, Giorgio, 2013. "The evolution of conventions in minimum effort games," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 259-277.
   2. Burkhard Hehenkamp & Oddvar Kaarbøe, 2004. "Equilibrium Selection in Supermodular Games with Mean Payoff Technologies," Discussion Papers in Economics 04_05, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics.
      • Hehenkamp, Burkhard & Kaarbøe, Oddvar M., 2004. "Equilibrium selection in supermodular games with mean payoff technologies," Working Papers in Economics 08/04, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
   3. V. Crawford, 2010. "Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 404, David K. Levine.
      • Crawford, Vincent P, 1995. "Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 103-143, January.
   4. Dietrichson, Jens & Gudmundsson, Jens & Jochem, Torsten, 2022. "Why don’t we talk about it? Communication and coordination in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 257-278.
   5. Oddvar M. Kaarbøe & Alexander F. Tieman, 0000. "Equilibrium Selection in Games with Macroeconomic Complementarities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-096/1, Tinbergen Institute.
      • Kaarboe, O.M. & Tieman, A.F., 2000. "Equilibrium Selection in Games with Macroeconomic Complementarities," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 2199, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
   6. Robles, Jack, 1998. "Evolution with Changing Mutation Rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 207-223, April.
   7. Dietrichson, Jens & Jochem, Torsten, 2014. "Organizational coordination and costly communication with boundedly rational agents," Comparative Institutional Analysis Working Paper Series 2014:1, Lund University, Comparative Institutional Analysis, School of Economics and Management.
   8. Dietrichson, Jens & Gudmundsson, Jens & Jochem, Torsten, 2014. "Let's Talk It Over: Communication and Coordination in Teams," Working Papers 2014:2, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 18 Apr 2018.
   9. Kim, Chongmin & Wong, Kam-Chau, 2010. "Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 242-254, January.
   10. Kevin Hasker, 2014. "The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000954, David K. Levine.
   11. Flavio M. Menezes & Paulo K. Monteiro & Akram Temimi, 1998. "Equilibrium Selection and the Rate of Convergence in Coordination Games with Simultaneous Play," Discussion Papers 98-14, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
   12. Dominik Erharter, 2013. "Promoting coordination in summary-statistic games," Working Papers 2013-28, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2000-02-21 2016-06-14
2. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2016-06-14
3. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2000-02-21
4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2016-06-09
5. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2000-02-21
6. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2016-06-14

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