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On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions

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  • Robles Jack

    ()
    (Victoria University of Wellington)

  • Shimoji Makoto

    ()
    (University of York)

Abstract

We extend Dekel and Wolinsky's (2003) result on private-value first price auctions by providing different sufficient conditions under which each player has a unique rationalizable bid conditional on her value. Unlike Dekel and Wolinsky's, our result does not necessarily require a large number of players. If values are independently distributed, (i) our conditions are weaker than Dekel and Wolinsky's, and (ii) our conditions require a large number of players only if the distributions on values has a low reverse hazard rate for some value. Our result holds for the cases where players' utility functions are concave or values are not identically distributed.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 12 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 1-21

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:12:y:2012:i:1:n:16

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Cited by:
  1. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
  2. Makoto Shimoji, 2014. "Revenue Comparison of Discrete Private-Value Auctions via Weak Dominance," Discussion Papers 14/13, Department of Economics, University of York.

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