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Gorkem Celik

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This is information that was supplied by Gorkem Celik in registering through RePEc. If you are Gorkem Celik , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name: Gorkem
Middle Name:
Last Name: Celik
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pce23

Email:
Homepage: http://www.essec.edu/professorsCV/showCV.do?keyUrl=celik-gorkem#
Postal Address:
Phone:

Affiliation

(50%) Théorie Économique, Modélisation, Application (THEMA)
Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Location: Cergy-Pontoise, France
Homepage: http://www.u-cergy.fr/thema/
Email:
Phone: 33 1 34 25 60 63
Fax: 33 1 34 25 62 33
Postal: 33, boulevard du port - 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex
Handle: RePEc:edi:themafr (more details at EDIRC)
(50%) ESSEC Business School
Location: Cergy-Pontoise, France
Homepage: http://www.essec.fr/
Email:
Phone:
Fax:
Postal: BP 50105, 95021 Cergy-Pontoise
Handle: RePEc:edi:essecfr (more details at EDIRC)

Lists

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations or Wikipedia entries:
  1. Turkish Economists

Works

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Working papers

  1. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics gorkem_celik-2011-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2011.
  2. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2008. "Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics gorkem_celik-2008-10, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
  3. Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar, 2005. "To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics celik-05-08-03-12-50-26, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
  4. Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2005. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics celik-05-05-09-03-55-40, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 09 Jun 2006.
  5. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics celik-04-01-23-02-48-07, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 27 Jan 2008.
  6. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics celik-04-09-13-05-50-40, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
  7. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.

Articles

  1. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 375-387.
  2. Celik Gorkem & Yilankaya Okan, 2009. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-33, July.
  3. Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January.
  4. Celik Gorkem, 2008. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-45, February.
  5. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September.
  6. Celik, Gorkem, 2006. "Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 37-44, July.

NEP Fields

6 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2011-08-09
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2008-08-21
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (2) 2008-08-21 2011-08-09. Author is listed
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2008-08-21 2011-08-09. Author is listed
  5. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (1) 2005-08-13
  6. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2004-06-02 2011-08-09. Author is listed
  7. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2005-08-13

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

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