Information about:
Gorkem Celik

Other registered authors

Email:
Homepage: http://www.econ.ubc.ca/cgorkem/homepage.htm
Postal Address:
Phone:

Affiliation

• Department of Economics
  University of British Columbia

  Location: Vancouver, Canada
  Homepage: http://www.econ.ubc.ca/
  Email:
  Phone: (604) 822-2876
  Fax: (604) 822-5915
  Postal: 997-1873 East Mall,Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z1
  Handle: RePEc:edi:deubcca (registered authors at this institution)

Working papers

1. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2008. "Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism," Micro Theory Working Papers gorkem_celik-2008-10, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]

2. Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar, 2005. "To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-05-08-03-12-50-26, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]

3. Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2005. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-05-05-09-03-55-40, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 09 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
   Published as:
   • Gorkem Celik & Okan Yilankaya, 2009. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 9(1), pages 1522-1522. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

4. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
   Published as:
   • Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

5. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-09-13-05-50-40, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
   Published as:
   • Celik, Gorkem, 2006. "Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 37-44, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

6. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-01-23-02-48-07, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 27 Jan 2008. [Downloadable!]

1. Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]

2. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

3. Gorkem Celik, 2008. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1363-1363. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

4. Celik, Gorkem, 2006. "Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 37-44, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-09-13-05-50-40, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]

1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2008-08-21
2. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2008-08-21
3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2008-08-21
4. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (1) 2005-08-13
5. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2004-06-02
6. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2005-08-13

This page was last updated on 2009-10-27.