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Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints

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  • Celik, Gorkem

Abstract

We study an adverse selection problem, where an agent is able to understate his productivity, but not allowed to overstate it. The solution to this problem is generally different than the solution to the standard problem, where no restriction is made on the statements of the agent. We identify a sufficient condition, that does not depend on the distribution of types, under which these two solutions coincide.

Suggested Citation

  • Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-09-13-05-50-40, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
    • Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-04-09-13-05-50-40
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alistair Munro, 2014. "Hide and Seek: A Theory of Efficient Income Hiding within the Household," GRIPS Discussion Papers 14-17, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
    2. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    3. Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2024. "Unidirectional Incentive Compatibility," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_524, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    4. Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
    5. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2022. "Dynamic Screening with Verifiable Bankruptcy," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 348, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    6. Sumit Goel & Wade Hann-Caruthers, 2020. "Project selection with partially verifiable information," Papers 2007.00907, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    7. Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2024. "Dynamic Screening with Verifiable Bankruptcy," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_525, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism Design; Incentive Compatibility;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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