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Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints

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  • Celik, Gorkem

Abstract

We study an adverse selection problem, where an agent is able to understate his productivity, but not allowed to overstate it. The solution to this problem is generally different than the solution to the standard problem, where no restriction is made on the statements of the agent. We identify a sufficient condition, that does not depend on the distribution of types, under which these two solutions coincide.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Microeconomics.ca Website in its series Micro Theory Working Papers with number celik-04-09-13-05-50-40.

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Length: 0 pages
Date of creation: 13 Sep 2004
Date of revision: 06 Aug 2008
Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-04-09-13-05-50-40

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Keywords: Mechanism Design; Incentive Compatibility;

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  1. Steven Matthews & John Moore, 1985. "Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening," Discussion Papers 661, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Beaudry, Paul & Blackorby, Charles, 2006. "Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 766, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  3. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414.
  4. Deneckere,R. & Severinov,S., 2001. "Mechanism design and communication costs," Working papers 23, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  5. Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 1995. "Costly Distortion of Information in Agency Problems," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 675-689, Winter.
  6. Lu Hong & Scott Page, 1994. "Reducing informational costs in endowment mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 103-117, December.
  7. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 447-56, July.
  8. Moore, John, 1988. "Contracting between Two Parties with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 49-69, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Itai Sher & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Price Discrimination Through Communication," Discussion Papers 1536, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

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