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Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints

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Author Info
Celik, Gorkem

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Abstract

We study an adverse selection problem, where an agent is able to understate his productivity, but not allowed to overstate it. The solution to this problem is generally different than the solution to the standard problem, where no restriction is made on the statements of the agent. We identify a sufficient condition, that does not depend on the distribution of types, under which these two solutions coincide.

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File URL: http://microeconomics.ca/gorkem_celik/wic0504.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Microeconomics.ca Website in its series Micro Theory Working Papers with number celik-04-09-13-05-50-40.

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Length: 0 pages
Date of creation: 13 Sep 2004
Date of revision: 06 Aug 2008
Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-04-09-13-05-50-40

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Related research
Keywords: Mechanism Design Incentive Compatibility

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Moore, John, 1988. "Contracting between Two Parties with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(1), pages 49-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. repec:att:wimass:1920123 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Beaudry, Paul & Blackorby, Charles, 2006. "Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 766, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Matthews, Steven & Moore, John, 1987. "Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 441-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 1995. "Costly Distortion of Information in Agency Problems," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 675-689, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(3), pages 447-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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