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Entre la peste et le choléra : le détenteur d’obligations peut préférer la répudiation au défaut…

Author

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  • Kim Oosterlinck
  • Loredana Ureche-Rangau

Abstract

[fre] Les dettes des États souverains souffrent régulièrement de suspensions de paiement. Le défaut, soit l’incapacité matérielle de faire face à ses obligations, ou la répudiation, soit le refus par l’État émetteur de reconnaître son engagement légal, sont, d’ordinaire, invoqués pour les justifier. Le défaut semble moins préjudiciable pour les détenteurs de ces titres. Dans ce cas, l’investisseur peut espérer, soit une solution négociée, soit une reprise du service de la dette si l’État défaillant parvient à redresser ses finances. Dans le cas de la répudiation, ces deux éléments sont sans objet. La présente analyse montre, sur la base de l’étude de deux séries d’emprunts (roumains et russes), que les cours boursiers d’emprunts répudiés peuvent être supérieurs à ceux faisant l’objet d’un défaut. L’anticipation d’événements probables ayant une grande influence potentielle sur les cours permet d’expliquer ce phénomène. . Classification JEL : F34, G15, G33, N20, N24 [eng] Sovereign debt : bondholders may prefer repudiation to default . Sovereign debts are often subject to payment suspension. Default, i.e. the financial incapacity to fulfil the debt service, and repudiation, i.e. the denial by a sovereign to recognize its legal obligations, are normally used to explain these payment suspensions. For bondholders, defaults should incur the smallest financial losses. In this case, bondholders may indeed hope for either a negotiated solution, or for a resumption of the debt service if the defaulting state manages to overcome its financial troubles. In the case of repudiations, these two elements are not relevant as repudiations usually go with a complete stop of the negotiation process. This paper shows, by using two series of bonds (Romanian and Russian bonds), that there are some situations when the market prices of repudiated bonds may stay above those of defaulted bonds. This counterintuitive observation is explained by market anticipation of possible events having a strong influence on the repudiated bond prices. . JEL classification : F34, G15, G33, N20, N24

Suggested Citation

  • Kim Oosterlinck & Loredana Ureche-Rangau, 2005. "Entre la peste et le choléra : le détenteur d’obligations peut préférer la répudiation au défaut…," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 79(2), pages 309-331.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2005_num_79_2_3992
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2005.3992
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2005.3992
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bernal, Oscar & Oosterlinck, Kim & Szafarz, Ariane, 2010. "Observing bailout expectations during a total eclipse of the sun," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1193-1205, November.
    2. Kim Oosterlinck & John Landon-Lane, 2006. "Hope springs eternal - French bondholders and the Soviet repudiation (1915-1919)," Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 10(4), pages 507-535, December.
    3. Mitchener, Kris James & Oosterlinck, Kim & Weidenmier, Marc D. & Haber, Stephen, 2015. "Victory or repudiation? Predicting winners in civil wars using international financial markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 310-319.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-

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