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Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short-Hour Jobs? An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives

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  • Rebitzer, James B
  • Taylor, Lowell J

Abstract

This paper examines the role that work incentives play in the determination of work hours. The authors use a conventional efficiency wage model to analyze how firms respond to worker preferences regarding wage-hours packages. In contrast to previous work, they study markets in which workers have heterogeneous preferences. In this context, the authors demonstrate that job offers will specify both wages and work hours and many individuals will not be able to work their preferred number of hours. They show that the labor-market equilibrium may be characterized by a less than optimal number of short-hour jobs. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 33 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 257-73

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:33:y:1995:i:2:p:257-73

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References

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  1. Akerlof, George A & Katz, Lawrence F, 1989. "Workers' Trust Funds and the Logic of Wage Profiles," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(3), pages 525-36, August.
  2. Summers, Lawrence H. & Dickens, William T. & Katz, Lawrence F. & Lang, Kevin, 1989. "Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle," Scholarly Articles 3645199, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Lang, Kevin, 1989. "Why was there mandatory retirement?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 127-136, June.
  4. Dickens, William T & Lundberg, Shelly J, 1993. "Hours Restrictions and Labor Supply," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(1), pages 169-92, February.
  5. Levine, David I, 1991. "Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(3), pages 294-305, July.
  6. Claudia Goldin, 1990. "Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American Women," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number gold90-1.
  7. Kahn, Shulamit & Lang, Kevin, 1991. "The Effect of Hours Constraints on Labor Supply Estimates," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(4), pages 605-11, November.
  8. Levine, David I, 1989. "Just-Cause Employment Policies When Unemployment Is a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 902-05, September.
  9. Jeremy I. Bulow & Lawrence H. Summers, 1986. "A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination and Keynesian Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 1666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Lazear, Edward P, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 606-20, September.
  11. Joseph Altonji & Christina Paxson, 1987. "Labor Supply Preferences, Hours Constraints, and Hours-Wage Tradeoffs," Working Papers 594, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  12. Joseph Altonji & Christina Paxson, 1985. "Job Characteristics and Hours of Work," Working Papers 578, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  13. Shulamit Kahn & Kevin Lang, 1987. "Constraints on the Choice of Work Hours: Agency vs. Specific-Capital," NBER Working Papers 2238, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  15. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 1991. "Work Incentives and the Demand for Primary and Contingent Labor," NBER Working Papers 3647, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1987. "The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-48, March.
  17. Shulamit B. Kahn & Kevin Lang, 1995. "The Causes of Hours Constraints: Evidence from Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(4a), pages 914-28, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Cowling, Marc, 2007. "Still At Work? An empirical test of competing theories of long hours culture," MPRA Paper 1614, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Joseph G. Altonji & Emiko Usui, 2005. "Work Hours, Wages, and Vacation Leave," NBER Working Papers 11693, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Lehmann, Jee-Yeon, 2011. "Job assignment and promotion under statistical discrimination: evidence from the early careers of lawyers," MPRA Paper 33466, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Joseph G. Altonji & Jennifer Oldham, 2003. "Vacation laws and annual work hours," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q III, pages 19-29.
  5. Guillaume ROCHETEAU, 2000. "Working Time Regulation in a Search Economy with Worker Moral Hazard," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 00.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  6. Oh, Seung-Yun & Park, Yongjin & Bowles, Samuel, 2012. "Veblen effects, political representation, and the reduction in working time over the 20th century," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 218-242.
  7. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
  8. David Campbell & Francis Green, 2002. "The Long Term Pay-Off From Working Longer Hours," Studies in Economics 0205, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
  9. Francis Green, 2000. "Why has Work Effort become more intense? Conjectures and Evidence about Effort-Biased Technical Change and other stories," Studies in Economics 0003, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
  10. Lonnie Golden, 2009. "A Brief History of Long Work Time and the Contemporary Sources of Overwork," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 84(2), pages 217-227, January.
  11. Fredrik Andersson, 2002. "Technological Change,Labour Contracts and Income Distribution," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 24-35, Spring.

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