Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Working Time Regulation in a Search Economy with Worker Moral Hazard

Contents:

Author Info

  • Guillaume ROCHETEAU

Abstract

This paper analyzes the consequences of a working time reduction within a matching model with worker moral hazard. In the "laissez faire", workers and employers bargain over wages and working hours. When the no-shirking condition (NSC) is binding, the number of working hours is lower than the level that would be negotiated in the case of perfect monitoring and a work-sharing policy increases aggregate employment. At the opposite, for low unemployment countries, the NSC does not bind and a working time regulation always worsens the labour market situation.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/00.06.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP in its series Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) with number 00.06.

as in new window
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2000
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Public Economics, vol. 84 (3), June 2002, pp. 387-425
Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:00.06

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne
Phone: ++41 21 692.33.64
Fax: ++41 21 692.33.05
Email:
Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications/cahiers/series
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: working time; unemployment; matching; shirking;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Boaz Moselle, 1996. "Efficiency Wages and the Hours/Unemployment Trade-Off," Discussion Papers 1153, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Rocheteau, Guillaume, 1999. "Balanced-Budget Rules and Indeterminacy of the Equilibrium Unemployment Rate," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 399-409, July.
  3. Brunello, Giorgio, 1989. "The Employment Effects of Shorter Working Hours: An Application to Japanese Data," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 56(224), pages 473-86, November.
  4. Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2000. "Employment and distributional effects of restricting working time," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1291-1326, June.
  5. Booth, Alison & Ravallion, Martin, 1993. "Employment and Length of the Working Week in a Unionized Economy in which Hours of Work Influence Productivity," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 69(207), pages 428-36, December.
  6. Hunt, Jennifer, 1997. "Has Work Sharing Worked in Germany?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1553, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Tor Jacobson & Henry Ohlsson, 2000. "Working time, employment, and work sharing: Evidence from Sweden," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 169-187.
  8. Booth, Alison & Schiantarelli, Fabio, 1987. "The Employment Effects of a Shorter Working Week," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 54(214), pages 237-48, May.
  9. Jennifer Hunt, 1998. "Hours Reductions as Work-Sharing," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1), pages 339-381.
  10. Mortensen, Dale T. & Pissarides, Christopher A., 1999. "New developments in models of search in the labor market," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 39, pages 2567-2627 Elsevier.
  11. Calmfors, Lars, 1985. "Work sharing, employment and wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 293-309.
  12. Hoel, Michael & Vale, Bent, 1986. "Effects on unemployment of reduced working time in an economy where firms set wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 1097-1104, October.
  13. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  14. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April.
  15. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 1991. "Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short Hour Jobs? An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives," NBER Working Papers 3883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Askenazy, Philippe, 2000. "35 heures: contrainte et laissez-faire," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 0002, CEPREMAP.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Patrick Artus & Pierre Cahuc & André Zylberberg, 2007. "Réglementation du temps de travail, revenu et emploi," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00255820, HAL.
  2. Giulio Fella, 2012. "Matching, Wage Rigidities and Efficient Severance Pay," Working Papers 698, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  3. Schreiber, Sven, 2008. "Did work-sharing work in France? Evidence from a structural co-integrated VAR model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 478-490, June.
  4. Arslan, Yavuz & Taskin, Temel, 2011. "Explaining the gender gaps in unemployment across OECD countries," MPRA Paper 34873, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Antonio García Sánchez & María del Mar Vázquez Méndez, 2005. "The timing of work in a general equilibrium model with shiftwork," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(1), pages 149-179, January.
  6. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00255770 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Guillaume ROCHETEAU, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment and Wage Formation with Matching Frictions and Worker Moral Hazard," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 00.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  8. Carlo Altavilla & Antonio Garofalo & Concetto Paolo Vinci, 2004. "Evaluating The Effects Of Working Hours On Employment And Wages," Working Papers 11_2004, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
  9. Norikazu Tawara, 2008. "No-shirking Conditions in Frictional Labor Markets," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10.
  10. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00255820 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1999. "Employment and Distributional Effects of Restricting Working Time," CEPR Discussion Papers 2127, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Camille Logeay & Sven Schreiber, 2006. "Testing the effectiveness of the French work-sharing reform: a forecasting approach," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(17), pages 2053-2068.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:00.06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Claudine Delapierre Saudan).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.