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Union wages, hours of work and the effectiveness of partial coordination agreements

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  • Wehke, Sven

Abstract

Small monopoly trade unions decide upon the wage rate per hour and the hours of work subject to firm's demand for union members. Since the resulting Nash equilibrium is characterized by excess unemployment, we study the employment and welfare effects when trade unions try to coordinate their policies. Firstly, we consider a joint agreement about marginal wage moderation, where trade unions remain free to choose the hours of work non-cooperatively. Secondly, we analyze in which way a joint change in the hours of work affects employment and welfare if trade unions are free to choose the wage rate.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Labour Economics.

Volume (Year): 16 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 89-96

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Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:16:y:2009:i:1:p:89-96

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/labeco

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Keywords: Unemployment Wage setting Hours of work Partial cooperation;

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Cited by:
  1. Inga Hillesheim & Laszlo Goerke, 2013. "Relative Consumption, Working Time, and Trade Unions," IAAEU Discussion Papers 201310, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).

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