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Government versus Union. The Structure of Optimal Taxation in a Unionized Labor Market

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  • Stefan Boeters
  • Kerstin Schneider

Abstract

This paper analyses optimal taxation with an imperfect labor market. Unemployment results from the market power of a monopoly union that determines the wage unilaterally. The government provides a public good and raises revenue by taxing rent, labor and capital income. Labor is immobile while capital is internationally traded. This paper focuses on the interaction between government and union. The Nash equilibrium is compared with the alternative of the Stackelberg leadership of the government. While the structure of the game has only a minor impact on the optimal choice of the tax on capital, the tax on labor depends critically on the structure of the interaction. Employment is lower when the government acts as a Stackelberg leader.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.

Volume (Year): 56 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 174-

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Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(199906)56:2_174:gvu_2.0.tx_2-k

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Sven Wehke, 2007. "Union Wages, Hours of Work and the Effectiveness of Partial Coordination Agreements," FEMM Working Papers 07019, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  2. Sven Wehke, 2008. "Fighting Tax Competition in the Presence of Unemployment: Complete versus Partial Tax Coordination," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 64(1), pages 33-62, March.
  3. Wolfram F. Richter & Kerstin Schneider, 2001. "Taxing Mobile Capital with Labor Market Imperfections," CESifo Working Paper Series 477, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Aronsson, Thomas & Wehke, Sven, 2008. "Public goods, unemployment and policy coordination," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 285-298, May.
  5. Koskela, Erkki & Schob, Ronnie, 2002. " Optimal Factor Income Taxation in the Presence of Unemployment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(3), pages 387-404.
  6. Stefan Boeters, 2004. "Green Tax Reform and Employment: The Interaction of Profit and Factor Taxes," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 60(2), pages 222-, August.
  7. Boeters, Stefan, 2002. "Tax Progressivity and the Trade Union's Fallback-Option," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-15, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  8. Aronsson, Thomas & Koskela, Erkki, 2008. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Provision of Public Input Goods in an Economy with Outsourcing and Unemployment," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 759, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
  9. Aronsson, Thomas & Koskela, Erkki, 2009. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Provision of Public Input Goods in an Economy with Outsourcing and Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 4196, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Pauser, Johannes, 2013. "Capital mobility, imperfect labour markets, and the provision of public goods," IAB Discussion Paper 201309, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
  11. Wolfgang Eggert & Laszlo Goerke, . "Fiscal Policy, Economic Integration and Unemployment," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  12. Ronnie Schöb, 2003. "The Double Dividend Hypothesis of Environmental Taxes: A Survey," Working Papers 2003.60, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  13. Thomas Aronsson & Erkki Koskela, 2008. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Provision of Public Input Goods in an Economy with Outsourcing and Unemployment," CESifo Working Paper Series 2481, CESifo Group Munich.
  14. Aronsson, Thomas & Wikström, Magnus, 2011. "Optimal Tax Progression: Does it Matter if Wage Bargaining is Centralized or Decentralized?," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 829, Umeå University, Department of Economics.

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