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Public Goods, Unemployment and Policy Coordination

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Author Info
Aronsson, Thomas () (Department of Economics, Umeå University)
Wehke, Sven () (Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management)

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Abstract

Earlier literature on tax competition and policy coordination typically assumes that the labor market is competitive; a description less suitable for Europe, where trade unions have had a strong position in the labor market for a long time. This paper concerns factor income taxation and public good provision in small open economies characterized by capital mobility and imperfect competition in the labor market. We assume that each national government collects public revenues via taxes on labor, capital and profit income, and that the revenues are spent on a public consumption good and a public input good, where the latter enters the economic system in terms of an `externality production factor'. The overall purposes are to characterize the tax and expenditure policies, if decided upon at the national level, and analyze the welfare effects of policy coordination with respect to taxes and public expenditures. Among the results, we show that tax coordination contributes to higher welfare if it reduces the net interest rate and the wage rate, and that the relative overprovision of the public input good derived by Keen and Marchand (1997) in the context of a competitive economy may no longer hold, if the labor market is non-competitive.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Umeå University, Department of Economics in its series Umeå Economic Studies with number 700.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 24 Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0700

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Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Phone: 090 - 786 61 42
Fax: 090 - 77 23 02
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Web page: http://www.econ.umu.se/
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Related research
Keywords: optimal taxation; wage bargaining; public goods; policy coordination;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bucovetsky, Sam & Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with two tax instruments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 333-350, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. McMillan, John, 1979. "A Note on the Economics of Public Intermediate Goods," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 34(2), pages 293-99.
  3. Thomas Aronsson & Tomas Sjögren, 2004. "Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 106(4), pages 661-675, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Arjan Lejour & Harrie Verbon, 1996. "Capital mobility, wage bargaining, and social insurance policies in an economic union," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 495-513, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Koskela, Erkki & Schob, Ronnie, 2002. " Optimal Factor Income Taxation in the Presence of Unemployment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(3), pages 387-404. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Thomas Aronsson & Mikael Markström & Tomas Sjögren, 2005. "Public Provision of Private Goods and Equilibrium Unemployment," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 61(3), pages 353-, November.
  7. Marceau, Nicolas & Boadway, Robin, 1994. " Minimum Wage Legislation and Unemployment Insurance as Instruments for Redistribution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 96(1), pages 67-81.
  8. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, 1997. "Wage bargaining, labor-tax progression, and welfare," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 127-150, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Wolfram Richter & Kerstin Schneider, 2001. "Taxing Mobile Capital with Labor Market Imperfections," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 245-262, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, . "Tax Coordination and Unemployment," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-26, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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  11. Stefan Boeters & Kerstin Schneider, 1999. "Government versus Union. The Structure of Optimal Taxation in a Unionized Labor Market," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 56(2), pages 174-, June.
  12. Keen, Michael & Marchand, Maurice, 1997. "Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 33-53, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Mintz, Jack & Tulkens, Henry, 1986. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-172, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Matsumoto, Mutsumi, 1998. "A note on tax competition and public input provision," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 465-473, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Diego Martinez & Tomas Sjögren, 2009. "Can Labor Market Imperfections Cause Overprovision of Public Inputs?," Working Papers 09.13, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Sven Wehke, 2007. "Fighting Tax Competition in the Presence of Unemployment: Complete versus Partial Tax Coordination," FEMM Working Papers 07010, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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