Subsidizing versus Experience Rating of Unemployment Insurance in Unionized Labor Markets
AbstractAlternative ways to organize government subsidies to unemployment insurance (UI) are analyzed in a right-to-manage model where industry-level unions run UI funds of their own. It is shown that equilibrium unemployment is decreasing in the share of UI financed by the employed union members. A reduction in the proportional subsidies matched by an increase in the lump-sum grant is shown to bring about wage moderation and improve employment. If labor-market parties can influence the level of benefits, a subsidy scheme with fixed assistance per unemployed is preferable to one covering a fixed share of the total UI costs.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.
Volume (Year): 60 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/fa
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
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- Dittrich, Marcus, 2006. "Welfare Effects of Union Bargaining Centralisation in a Two-Sector Economy," MPRA Paper 11, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2006.
- Sven Wehke, 2007.
"Union Wages, Hours of Work and the Effectiveness of Partial Coordination Agreements,"
FEMM Working Papers
07019, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Wehke, Sven, 2009. "Union wages, hours of work and the effectiveness of partial coordination agreements," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 89-96, January.
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