Labor organizations currently argue that reducing the standard working week will help lower the high unemployment of the 1980s. Opponents maintai n that this will increase labor costs, and therefore not alleviate un employment. This paper analyzes the employment effects of a cut in ho urs, using the monopoly union and efficient bargaining models of the union and firm. Under various developments of the models, the results are quite consistent: a reduction in hours has employment effects th at are at best ambiguous and very often negative. A puzzle remains as to why trade unions are pressing for shorter hours. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 54 (1987) Issue (Month): 214 (May) Pages: 237-48 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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