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The beneficial effects of generous unemployment benefits on profits and employment

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  • Pisauro, Giuseppe
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 18 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 4 (November)
    Pages: 739-760

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:18:y:2002:i:4:p:739-760

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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    1. Atkinson, Anthony B & Micklewright, John, 1991. "Unemployment Compensation and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 29(4), pages 1679-1727, December.
    2. Steven Shavell & Laurence Weiss, 1978. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 503, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-38, April.
    4. George A. Akerlof & Lawrence F. Katz, 1988. "Workers' Trust Funds and the Logic of Wage Profiles," NBER Working Papers 2548, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Flemming, J. S., 1978. "Aspects of optimal unemployment insurance : Search, leisure, savings and capital market imperfections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 403-425, December.
    6. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
    7. Saint-Paul, G., 1996. "The rise and persistence of rigidities," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) 96-21, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    8. Berkowitz, Edward & McQuaid, Kim, 1978. "Businessman and Bureaucrat: The Evolution of the American Social Welfare System, 1900–1940," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 120-142, March.
    9. Lazear, Edward P, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 606-20, September.
    10. Macleod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M., 1989. "Wage Premiums And Profit Maximization In Efficiency Wage Models," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 114.89, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    11. Carl Davidson & Stephen A. Woodbury, 1995. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 95-35, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    12. Rosen, Sherwin, 1985. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 1144-75, September.
    13. A. B. Atkinson, 1999. "The Economic Consequences of Rolling Back the Welfare State," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011719, December.
    14. Lei Delsen & Antoine Jacobs*, 1999. "The Management of Redundancies in Europe: The Case of the Netherlands," LABOUR, CEIS, CEIS, vol. 13(1), pages 123-182, 03.
    15. Layard, R. & Nickell, S., 1991. "Unemployment in the OECD Countries," Economics Series Working Papers 99130, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    16. Oswald, Andrew J, 1986. "Unemployment Insurance and Labor Contracts under Asymmetric Information: Theory and Facts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 365-77, June.
    17. Edi Karni, 1999. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance: A Survey," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 442-465, October.
    18. Stephen Nickell, 1997. "Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 55-74, Summer.
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