Bonding, shirking and adverse selection
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economic Modelling.
Volume (Year): 21 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30411
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