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Funzionamento del mercato del lavoro in presenza di informazione asimmetrica. Una rassegna della letteratura

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  • Canegallo, Claudia

Abstract

Il problema dell'informazione asimmetrica nel mercato del lavoro e' stato affrontato ripercorrendo la letteratura relativa agli sviluppi dei modelli di salari di efficienza, nelle varie categorie di selezione avversa, azzardo morale e segnalazione. Per ognuna di queste categorie sono stati ripercorsi gli sviluppi piu' recenti e le applicazioni piu' specifiche, con una particolare attenzione nei confronti dei contributi che hanno cercato di trovare un collegamento fra le varie categorie di informazione asimmetrica. Piu' problematico e' risultato ricondurre i temi dell'informazione asimmetrica all'ambito macroeconomico della New Keynesian Economics. A parte qualche recentissimo contributo in tal senso, non vi e' ancora stata una risposta definitiva in grado di quantificare se e quanta parte della disoccupazione esistente sia riconducibile alla presenza di informazione asimmetrica nel mercato del lavoro. In questo campo, gli sviluppi possibili sono ancora molto numerosi.

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  • Canegallo, Claudia, 1999. "Funzionamento del mercato del lavoro in presenza di informazione asimmetrica. Una rassegna della letteratura," POLIS Working Papers 8, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    • Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:8
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    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity

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