Repayment versus Investment Conditions and Exclusivity in Lending Contracts
Abstract
Lenders condition future loans on some index of past performance. Typically, banks condition future loans on repayments of earlier obligations, whilst international organizations (official lenders) condition future loans on the implementation of some policy action (iinvestmentj). We build an agency model that accounts for these tendencies. The optimal conditionality contract depends on exclusivity - the likelihood that a borrower who has been denied funds from the original lenders cannot access funds from other lenders.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 167 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 247-265
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
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Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Bougheas, Spiros & Dasgupta, Indraneel & Morrissey, Oliver, 2009. "Repayment versus Investment Conditions and Exclusivity in Lending Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 4604, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Burger, Ronelle & Dasgupta, Indraneel & Owens, Trudy, 2011.
"A Model of NGO Regulation with an Application to Uganda,"
IZA Discussion Papers
6221, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Ronelle Burger & Indraneel Dasgupta & Trudy Owens, 2011. "A Model of NGO Regulation with an Application to Uganda," Working Papers 22/2011, Stellenbosch University, Department of Economics.
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