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External Debt, Adjustment, and Burden Sharing: A Unified Framework

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Author Info
Diwan, I.
Rodrik, D.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University, in its series Princeton Studies in International Economics with number 73.

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Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:prinfi:73

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Postal: International Finance Section, Department of Economics Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A
Phone: (609) 258-4000
Fax: (609) 258-6419
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Web page: http://www.econ.princeton.edu/
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Related research
Keywords: debt ; economic models ; mathematics;

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  1. Giulio Federico, 2001. "IMF Conditionality," Economics Papers 2001-W19, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Sep 2001. [Downloadable!]
  2. Prasanna Gai & Nicholas Vause, . "Sovereign debt workouts with the IMF as delegated monitor - a common agency approach," Bank of England working papers 187, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hefeker, Carsten & Michaelowa, Katharina, 2003. "Can Process Conditionality Enhance Aid Effectiveness? The Role of Bureaucratic Interest and Public Pressure," Discussion Paper Series 26389, Hamburg Institute of International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Dani Rodrik, 1995. "Why is there Multilateral Lending?," NBER Working Papers 5160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Drazen, Allan, 2002. "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995. "Sovereign Debt," NBER Working Papers 5131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-24.

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