Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jeffrey Sachs
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper raises several cautionary notes regarding high-conditionality lending by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the context of international debt crisis. It is argued that the role for high-conditionality lending is more restricted than generally believed, because enforcement of conditionality is rather weak. Moreover, the incentives for a country to abide by conditionality terms are also likely to be reduced by a large overhang of external indebtedness. Given the limited ability to enforce conditionality agreements, modesty and realism should be a cornerstone of each program. The experience with conditionality suggests two major lessons for the design of high-conditionality lending. First, debt forgiveness rather than mere debt rescheduling may increase a debtor country's compliance with conditionality, and thereby increase the actual stream of repayments by the indebted countries. Second, given the complexity of the needed adjustments, and the difficulty of enforcing conditionality agreements, programs are most likely to be successful when macroeconomic stabilization is given priority over large-scale liberalization.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w2644.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 2644.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: Jul 1988
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: published as With Harry Huizinga, published as "U.S. Commercial Banks and the Developing-Country Debt Crisis", BP, Vol. 18, no. 2 (1987): 555-601.
    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2644

    Note: ITI IFM
    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
    Phone: 617-868-3900
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.nber.org
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Corbo, Vittorio & De Melo, Jaime, 1985. "Overview and summary," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 13(8), pages 863-866, August.
    2. Krugman, Paul, 1988. "Financing vs. forgiving a debt overhang," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 253-268, November.
    3. Jeffrey Sachs & Daniel Cohen, 1982. "LDC Borrowing with Default Risk," NBER Working Papers 0925, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1987. "Trade and Exchange Rate Policies in Growth-Oriented Adjustment Programs," NBER Working Papers 2226, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1985. "External Debt and Macroeconomic Performance in Latin America and East Asia," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 16(2), pages 523-573.
    6. von Furstenberg, George M., 1985. "Adjustment with IMF lending," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 209-222, June.
    7. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1986. "Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 72-81, March.
    8. Balassa, Bela, 1984. "Adjustment policies in developing countries: A reassessment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 12(9), pages 955-972, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Idlemouden, Khadija & Raffinot, Marc, 2005. "Le fardeau virtuel de la dette extérieure. Une revue de la littérature à l'aune de l'initiative « pays pauvres très endettés » (PPTE)," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4089, Paris Dauphine University.
    2. Joshua Aizenman & Eduardo R. Borensztein, 1989. "Strategic Investment in a Debt Bargaining Framework," NBER Working Papers 3019, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Sebastian Edwards, 1989. "On the Sequencing of Structural Reforms," NBER Working Papers 3138, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Almuth Scholl, 2013. "Debt Relief for Poor Countries: Conditionality and Effectiveness," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-23, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    5. Blackman, Allen & Nelson, Per-Kristian & Mathis, Mitchell, 2001. "The Greening of Development Economics: A Survey," Discussion Papers dp-01-08, Resources For the Future.
    6. Froot, Kenneth A, 1989. "Buybacks, Exit Bonds, and the Optimality of Debt and Liquidity Relief," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(1), pages 49-70, February.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2644. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.