Why are junior doctors reluctant to consult attending physicians?
AbstractA physician performs two tasks: making diagnoses and determining treatments. To reduce medical error, junior doctors are supposed to consult their supervisors when they face uncommon circumstances. However, recent research shows that junior doctors are reluctant to do so. This paper presents a model that explains (i) which junior doctors shy away from consulting; (ii) when junior doctors are reluctant; (iii) the importance of protocols in the medical sector; and (iv) when consulting is a sign of strength or a sign of weakness. Furthermore, I show that encouraging junior doctors to consult by investigating mishaps leads to another distortion: they will give too much weight to own assessments.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.
Volume (Year): 29 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560
Medical error Medical decision-making Reputational concerns Consulting;
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