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Why are junior doctors reluctant to consult attending physicians?

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  • Swank, Otto H.

Abstract

A physician performs two tasks: making diagnoses and determining treatments. To reduce medical error, junior doctors are supposed to consult their supervisors when they face uncommon circumstances. However, recent research shows that junior doctors are reluctant to do so. This paper presents a model that explains (i) which junior doctors shy away from consulting; (ii) when junior doctors are reluctant; (iii) the importance of protocols in the medical sector; and (iv) when consulting is a sign of strength or a sign of weakness. Furthermore, I show that encouraging junior doctors to consult by investigating mishaps leads to another distortion: they will give too much weight to own assessments.

Suggested Citation

  • Swank, Otto H., 2010. "Why are junior doctors reluctant to consult attending physicians?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 317-324, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:29:y:2010:i:2:p:317-324
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Margaret Brunton, 2017. "Risking the Sustainability of the Public Health System: Ethical Conundrums and Ideologically Embedded Reform," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 142(4), pages 719-734, June.

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