1. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
2. Eaton, J., 1990. "Sovereign Debt, Reputation, And Credit Terms," Papers 223, Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research.
   Other versions:
   • Jonathan Eaton, 1990. "Sovereign Debt, Reputation, and Credit Terms," NBER Working Papers 3424, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Eaton, Jonathan, 1996. "Sovereign Debt, Reputation and Credit Terms," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 1(1), pages 25-35, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
4. Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-97, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, 1989. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 1673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-62, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Allen, Franklin & Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1988. "Optimism Invites Deception," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 397-407, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," NBER Working Papers 2623, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Bulow, J. & Rogoff, K., 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," Papers 411, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
8. Martinelli, Cesar, 1997. "Small firms, borrowing constraints, and reputation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 91-105, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
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1. Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-Robustness," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-17, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. " Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-robustness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(3-4), pages 319-47, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Muriel Niederle & Josef Perktold, 2000. "Market Institutions and Quality Enforcement," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1482, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
3. Steffen Huck & Wieland Mueller, 1998. "Perfect versus imperfect observability---An experimental test of Bagwell's result," Experimental 9804001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2000. "Perfect versus Imperfect Observability--An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 174-190, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. repec:att:wimass:19199818 is not listed on IDEAS