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Bargaining with endogenous deadlines

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  • Mauleon, Ana
  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent

Abstract

We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique outcome is always inefficient

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 54 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 321-335

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:54:y:2004:i:3:p:321-335

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References

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  1. Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 1999. "Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 53-68.
  2. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 1998. "The Equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg Iterative Procedure and Weakly Perfect Rationalizability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1173, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-52, March.
  4. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October.
  5. Ma, Ching-To Albert & Manove, Michael, 1993. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1313-39, November.
  6. Vincent Vannetelbosch, 1999. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining and Common Knowledge of Rationality," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 111-138, October.
  7. Damme, E.E.C. van & Selten, R. & Winter, E., 1990. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154420, Tilburg University.
  8. Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters," Papers 99-00-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  9. VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 1996. "Rationalizability and Equilibrium in N-Person Sequential Bargaining," CORE Discussion Papers 1996041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Watson, Joel, 1998. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 573-94, July.
  11. Nelson, Morton & Amoako-Adu, Ben & Smith, Brian, 1994. "Impact of labor strikes on equity values: Canadian evidence," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 153-165, August.
  12. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  13. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
  14. Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
  15. Laszlo Goerke & Manfred J. Holler, 1999. "Strike Ballots as a Commitment Device," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(3), pages 487-, September.
  16. Perry Motty & Reny Philip J., 1993. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 50-77, February.
  17. Brian E. Becker & Craig A. Olson, 1986. "The impact of strikes on shareholder equity," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 39(3), pages 425-438, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2008. "Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 457-474, December.
  2. Juan J. Vidal Puga, 2006. "Reinterpreting The Meaning Of Breakdown," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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