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Bargaining with Endogenous Deadlines

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Author Info
Ana MAULEON () (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))
Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH () (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

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Abstract

We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique outcome is always inefficient

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Discussion Paper with number 2001021.

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Length: 12
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2001021

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Related research
Keywords: bargaining alternating-offers deadlines complete infomation

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 1998. "The Equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg Iterative Procedure and Weakly Perfect Rationalizability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1173, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Vannetelbosch, V.J., 1996. "Rationalizability and Equilibrium in N-Person Sequential Bargaining," Papers 9641, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
  3. Ma, Ching-To Albert & Manove, Michael, 1993. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1313-39, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Van Damme, Eric & Selten, Reinhard & Winter, Eyal, 1990. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 188-201, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Perry Motty & Reny Philip J., 1993. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 50-77, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Watson, Joel, 1998. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(3), pages 573-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-52, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Juan J. Vidal Puga, 2006. "Reinterpreting The Meaning Of Breakdown," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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