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Bargaining with Endogenous Deadlines

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  • Ana MAULEON

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

  • Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

Abstract

We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique outcome is always inefficient

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 2001021.

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Length: 12
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2001021

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Keywords: bargaining; alternating-offers; deadlines; complete infomation;

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References

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  1. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
  2. Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000011, David K. Levine.
  3. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  4. Herings, P.J.J. & Vannetelbosch, V., 1997. "Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1997-03, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2000. "The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 677-687.
  6. Watson, Joel, 1998. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 573-94, July.
  7. Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
  8. Damme, E.E.C. van & Selten, R. & Winter, E., 1989. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1989-32, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. Brian E. Becker & Craig A. Olson, 1986. "The impact of strikes on shareholder equity," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 39(3), pages 425-438, April.
  10. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October.
  11. Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 1999. "Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 353-371.
  12. Perry Motty & Reny Philip J., 1993. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 50-77, February.
  13. Vincent Vannetelbosch, 1999. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining and Common Knowledge of Rationality," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 111-138, October.
  14. Nelson, Morton & Amoako-Adu, Ben & Smith, Brian, 1994. "Impact of labor strikes on equity values: Canadian evidence," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 153-165, August.
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  16. Raquel Fernandez & Jacob Glazer, 1989. "Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents," NBER Working Papers 3108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Ching-to Albert Ma & Michael Manove, 1991. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0007, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
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Cited by:
  1. Juan J. Vidal Puga, 2006. "Reinterpreting The Meaning Of Breakdown," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2006-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  2. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2008. "Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 457-474, December.

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