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Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Juan Vidal-Puga ()
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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory .
Volume (Year): 37 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 457-474
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:37:y:2008:i:4:p:457-474Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
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Keywords: Breakdown ; Bargaining ; Delay ; C72 ; C78 ; References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995.
"Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-35, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2002.
"On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1477-1517, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2004.
"Going Alone Together: Joint Outside Options in Bilateral Negotiations ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(498), pages 943-960, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986.
"The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Manzini, Paola, 1999.
"Strategic bargaining with destructive power ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 315-322, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Ma, Ching-To Albert & Manove, Michael, 1993.
"Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1313-39, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Hart, Oliver, 1989.
"Bargaining and Strikes ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 25-43, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2004.
"Bargaining with endogenous deadlines ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 321-335, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Yossi Feinberg & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2005.
"Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 69-91, 01.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993.
"Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B., 1994.
"Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 154-168, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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