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The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability

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  • HERINGS, P. J.-J.

    ()
    (Department of Econometrics and CentER, Tilburg University)

  • VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J.

    ()
    (nstituto de Economia Publica, Basque Country University)

Abstract

Two approaches have been proposed in the literature to refine the rationalizability solution concept: either assuming that players make small errors when playing their strategies, or assuming that there is a small amount of payoff uncertainty. We show that both approaches lead to the same refinement if errors are made according to the concept of weakly perfect rationalizability, and there is payoff uncertainty as in Dekel and Fudenberg [J. of Econ. Theory 52 (1990), 243-267]. For both cases, the strategies that survive are obtained by starting with one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed by many rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1998029.

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Date of creation: 01 May 1998
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1998029

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Keywords: rationalizability; refinements;

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  1. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  2. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
  3. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November.
  4. Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 1999. "Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 53-68.
  5. Gul, Faruk, 1996. "Rationality and Coherent Theories of Strategic Behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 1-31, July.
  6. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
  7. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1997. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect-Information Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 23-46, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Grandjean Gilles & Mauleon Ana & Vannetelbosch Vincent, 2009. "Strongly Rational Sets for Normal-Form Games," Research Memorandum 059, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., . "Bargaining with endogenous deadlines," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1719, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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