The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability
AbstractTwo approaches have been proposed in the literature to reﬁne the rationalizability solution concept: either assuming that players make small errors when playing their strategies, or assuming that there is a small amount of payoff uncertainty. We show that both approaches lead to the same reﬁnement if errors are made according to the concept of weakly perfect rationalizability, and there is payoff uncertainty as in Dekel and Fudenberg [J. of Econ. Theory 52 (1990), 243-267]. For both cases, the strategies that survive are obtained by starting with one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed by many rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1998029.
Date of creation: 01 May 1998
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Other versions of this item:
- Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2000. "The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 677-687.
- P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 1998. "The Equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg Iterative Procedure and Weakly Perfect Rationalizability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1173, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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