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Impacts of a mandatory shift to decentralized online auctions on revenue from public land leases in Ukraine

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  • Deininger, Klaus W.
  • Ali, Daniel Ayalew
  • Neyter, Roman

Abstract

We analyze the impact of a 2021 reform in Ukraine that—after earlier digitization efforts did not produce desired results—mandated use of transparent online auctions by local governments rather than a central agency to lease rights to public agricultural land. The shift to a collusion-proof electronic auction system increased lease revenue by 175% for our preferred specification. Had all public land that Ukraine transferred since 2015 been auctioned using post-reform mechanisms, local governments would receive incremental lease revenue of US$500 million per year for the duration of the lease. Where public land is important, reforms to ensure rights to such land are allocated transparently, competitively and in a decentralized way could improve social, economic, and environmental outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Deininger, Klaus W. & Ali, Daniel Ayalew & Neyter, Roman, 2023. "Impacts of a mandatory shift to decentralized online auctions on revenue from public land leases in Ukraine," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 213(C), pages 432-450.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:213:y:2023:i:c:p:432-450
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.07.029
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    References listed on IDEAS

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