Reducing informal payments in the health care system: Evidence from a large patient satisfaction survey
AbstractPaucity of information on the informal market for health services hampers the governments’ efforts in performing their desirable roles in informing, regulating, mandating, financing and providing health services to their people. Analysis of data from a survey of almost 20,000 patients fills a void in understanding informal payments in the countries in transition. A probability model of informal payments shows that knowledge and information have significant impact on reducing frequency of informal payments. Thus, informing patients, which is the least expensive and intrusive role of the government, could significantly reduce out-of-pocket health care spending.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Asian Economics.
Volume (Year): 23 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/asieco
Economic transition; Health; Corruption; Informal payments; Patient satisfaction survey;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- P36 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
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