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Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a corruption game: An experimental analysis

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  • Berninghaus, Siegfried K.
  • Haller, Sven
  • Krüger, Tyll
  • Neumann, Thomas
  • Schosser, Stephan
  • Vogt, Bodo

Abstract

For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the participants' risk attitudes failed to explain their choices between corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. Instead, beliefs appeared to be a better predictor of whether or not they would opt for the corrupt alternative. Furthermore, varying the quantity of information available to players (modeled by changing the degree of uncertainty) provided additional insight into the players' propensity to engage in corrupt behavior. The experimental results show that a higher degree of uncertainty in the informational setting reduces corruption. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering in its series Working Paper Series in Economics with number 6.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:kitwps:6

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Keywords: Corruption; game theory; experiment; risk attitude; beliefs;

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Cited by:
  1. Mokhtari, Manouchehr & Ashtari, Mamak, 2012. "Reducing informal payments in the health care system: Evidence from a large patient satisfaction survey," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 189-200.
  2. Fahr, René & Djawadi, Behnud Mir, 2012. "The impact of risk perception and risk attitudes on corrupt behavior: Evidence from a petty corruption experiment," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62022, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  3. van Veldhuizen, R., 2013. "The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 341-356.
  4. van Veldhuizen, Roel, 2013. "The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: A laboratory investigation," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-210, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

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