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Citations for "Efficiency in partnerships"

by Patrick Legros & Hitoshi Matsushima

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  1. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Incentives in Hedge Funds," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-714, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  2. Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege, 1998. "Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents With Moral Hazard," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(2), pages 422-450, June.
  3. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1823, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2012.
  4. Ichiro Obara, "undated". "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 399, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 311-336, November.
  6. Hege, U. & Viala, P., 1997. "Contentious Contracts," Discussion Paper 1997-109, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. De Marco, Giuseppe & Immordino, Giovanni, 2013. "Partnership, reciprocity and team design," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 39-58.
  8. Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 599-611.
  9. Slivinski, Al, 2002. " Team Incentives and Organizational Form," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 185-206.
  10. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
  11. Debraj Ray & Jean-Marie Baland & Olivier Dagnelie, 2007. "Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 922-935, 07.
  12. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
  13. Falconieri, S. & Palomino, F.A. & Sakovics, J., 2002. "Collective vs Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports," Discussion Paper 2002-106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  14. Zhao, Rui R., 2007. "Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 601-640, September.
  15. Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  16. Nandeibam, Shasikanta, 2002. "Sharing Rules in Teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 407-420, December.
  17. Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2006. "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics.
  18. Al-Najjar, Nabil I., 1997. "Incentive Contracts in Two-Sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 174-195, May.
  19. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 1994. "A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 227-250, December.
  20. Michael T. Rauh, 2014. "Incentives, wages, employment, and the division of labor in teams," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 533-552, 09.
  21. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role Of Relative And Absolute Performance Evaluations In Intergroup Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 443-454, December.
  22. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen," MPRA Paper 6930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Battaglini, Marco, 2006. "Joint production in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 138-167, September.
  24. Mauricio S. Bugarin, 2015. "Efficiency in a Monotonic Partnership with Investment: An Endogenous Implementation of Holmstrom’s Principal," Bulletin of Business and Economics (BBE), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 4(3), pages 127-135, September.
  25. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  26. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  27. Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 1999. "Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 275-294, November.
  28. Dunia López-Pintado & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2011. "On the optimal management of teams under budget constraints," Working Papers 11.11, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
  29. Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2016. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1015, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  30. Corts, Kenneth S., 2006. "The interaction of task and asset allocation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 887-906, September.
  31. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
  32. Miller, Nolan H., 1997. "Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 285-299, December.
  33. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 59, David K. Levine.
  34. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Multi-Group Incentives," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-201, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  35. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2016. "Teams in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016/23, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
  36. Verbeck, Matthias, 2015. "Contracting with Researchers," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112963, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  37. Kim, Son Ku & Wang, Susheng, 1998. "Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 342-378, October.
  38. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-179, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  39. Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  40. Matthias Verbeck & Elisabeth Schulte, 2016. "Contracting with Researchers," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201620, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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