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Citations for "Efficiency in partnerships"

by Patrick Legros & Hitoshi Matsushima

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  1. Ulrich Hege & Pascale Viala, 2012. "Contentious Contracts," Working Papers hal-00759794, HAL.
  2. Dunia López-Pintado & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2011. "On the optimal management of teams under budget constraints," Working Papers 11.11, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
  3. Al Slivinski, 1999. "Team Incentives and Organizational Form," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9916, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  4. Patrick Legros & Steven Matthews, 1993. "Efficient and nearly efficient partnerships," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7040, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  5. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: an overview," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000270, David K. Levine.
  7. Mauricio S. Bugarin, 2015. "Efficiency in a Monotonic Partnership with Investment: An Endogenous Implementation of Holmstrom’s Principal," Bulletin of Business and Economics (BBE), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 4(3), pages 127-135, September.
  8. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role Of Relative And Absolute Performance Evaluations In Intergroup Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 443-454, December.
  9. Zhao, Rui R., 2007. "Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 601-640, September.
  10. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-97, October.
  11. Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege, 1998. "Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents With Moral Hazard," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(2), pages 422-450, June.
  12. Michael T. Rauh, 2013. "Incentives, Wages, Employment, and the Division of Labor in Teams," Working Papers 2013-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  13. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Multi-Group Incentives," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-201, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  14. Ichiro Obara, . "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 399, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-179, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  16. Falconieri, S. & Palomino, F.A. & Sakovics, J., 2002. "Collective vs Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports," Discussion Paper 2002-106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  17. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 1994. "A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 227-250, December.
  18. Kim, Son Ku & Wang, Susheng, 1998. "Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 342-378, October.
  19. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  20. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 59, David K. Levine.
  21. Giuseppe De Marco & Giovanni Immordino, 2010. "Partnership, Reciprocity and Team Design," CSEF Working Papers 257, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 24 Mar 2011.
  22. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Incentives in Hedge Funds," CARF F-Series CARF-F-205, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  23. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
  24. Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 1999. "Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 275-294, November.
  25. Corts, Kenneth S., 2006. "The interaction of task and asset allocation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 887-906, September.
  26. Miller, Nolan H., 1997. "Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 285-299, December.
  27. Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  28. Battaglini, Marco, 2006. "Joint production in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 138-167, September.
  29. Debraj Ray & Jean-Marie Baland & Olivier Dagnelie, 2007. "Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 922-935, 07.
  30. Al-Najjar, Nabil I., 1997. "Incentive Contracts in Two-Sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 174-195, May.
  31. Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2006. "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics.
  32. Nandeibam, Shasikanta, 2002. "Sharing Rules in Teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 407-420, December.
  33. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen," MPRA Paper 6930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  34. Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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