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Citations for "Efficiency in partnerships"

by Patrick Legros & Hitoshi Matsushima

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  1. Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2006. "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Debraj Ray & Jean-Marie Baland & Olivier Dagnelie, 2007. "Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects," Post-Print halshs-00160753, HAL.
  3. Battaglini, Marco, 2006. "Joint production in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 138-167, September.
  4. Hege, Ulrich & Viala, Pascale, 1998. "Contentious Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1910, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen," MPRA Paper 6930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Giuseppe De Marco & Giovanni Immordino, 2010. "Partnership, Reciprocity and Team Design," CSEF Working Papers 257, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 24 Mar 2011.
  7. Michael T. Rauh, 2013. "Incentives, Wages, Employment, and the Division of Labor in Teams," Working Papers 2013-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  8. Slivinski, Al, 2002. " Team Incentives and Organizational Form," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 185-206.
  9. Kim, Son Ku & Wang, Susheng, 1998. "Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 342-378, October.
  10. Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  11. Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  12. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000270, David K. Levine.
  13. Dunia López-Pintado & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2011. "On the optimal management of teams under budget constraints," Working Papers 11.11, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
  14. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-97, October.
  15. Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1992. "Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships," Discussion Papers 991R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Nandeibam, Shasikanta, 2002. "Sharing Rules in Teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 407-420, December.
  17. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition," CARF F-Series CARF-F-213, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  18. Al-Najjar, Nabil I., 1997. "Incentive Contracts in Two-Sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 174-195, May.
  19. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Incentives in Hedge Funds," CARF F-Series CARF-F-205, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  20. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 1994. "A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 227-250, December.
  21. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 311-336, November.
  22. Zhao, Rui R., 2007. "Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 601-640, September.
  23. Miller, Nolan H., 1997. "Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 285-299, December.
  24. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Multi-Group Incentives," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-201, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  25. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-179, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  26. Ichiro Obara, . "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 399, UCLA Department of Economics.
  27. Falconieri, S. & Palomino, F.A. & Sakovics, J., 2002. "Collective vs Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports," Discussion Paper 2002-106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  28. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
  29. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 59, David K. Levine.
  30. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  31. Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege, 1998. "Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents With Moral Hazard," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(2), pages 422-450, June.
  32. Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 1999. "Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 275-294, November.
  33. Corts, Kenneth S., 2006. "The interaction of task and asset allocation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 887-906, September.
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