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Tax subsidies, the rational demand for insurance and the health care crisis

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. William M. Gentry & Eric Peress, 1994. "Taxes and Fringe Benefits Offered by Employers," NBER Working Papers 4764, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Charles E. Phelps, 1984. "Taxing Health Insurance: How Much Is Enough?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 3(2), pages 47-54, December.
  3. Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018. "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(2), pages 137-185, September.
  4. Melissa A. Thomasson, 2003. "The Importance of Group Coverage: How Tax Policy Shaped U.S. Health Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1373-1384, September.
  5. Cannon Michael F., 2008. "Large Health Savings Accounts: A Step toward Tax Neutrality for Health Care," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 1-29, March.
  6. John A. Nyman, 2012. "The Value of Health Insurance," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  7. Gianluca Baio & Laura Magazzini & Claudia Oglialoro & Fabio Pammolli & Massimo Riccaboni, 2005. "Medical Devices: Competitiveness and Impact on Public Health Expenditure," Working Papers CERM 05-2005, Competitività, Regole, Mercati (CERM).
  8. Jonathan Gruber & James M. Poterba, 1993. "Tax Incentives and the Decision to Purchase Health Insurance: Evidence from the Self-Employed," NBER Working Papers 4435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Jonathan Gruber & Helen Levy, 2009. "The Evolution of Medical Spending Risk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(4), pages 25-48, Fall.
  10. Juergen Jung & Chung Tran, 2015. "Social Health Insurance: A Quantitative Exploration," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2015-629, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  11. Johannes Mauritzen, 2017. "Cost, Contractors and Scale: An Empirical Analysis of the California Solar Market," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 6).
  12. Martin Feldstein, 1993. "Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the 1980s: A Personal View," NBER Working Papers 4324, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2017. "On the Design of Optimal Health Insurance Contracts under Ex Post Moral Hazard," Working Papers hal-01348551, HAL.
  14. Martin Feldstein & Jonathan Gruber, 1995. "A Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 9, pages 103-130, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Blomqvist, Ake, 1997. "Optimal non-linear health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 303-321, June.
  16. Richard Dusansky & Çağatay Koç, 2016. "Individual Welfare When Consumers Can Shop For Health Insurance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 1283-1290, April.
  17. Parry, Ian W.H., 1999. "Tax Deductions, Consumption Distortions, and the Marginal Excess Burden of Taxation," Discussion Papers 10801, Resources for the Future.
  18. Jack, William, 2002. "Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with ex ante adverse selection and ex post moral hazard," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 251-278, May.
  19. Batifoulier, Philippe, 2015. "Aux origines de la privatisation du financement du soin : quand la théorie de l’aléa moral rencontre le capitalisme sanitaire," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 17.
  20. Mark Stabile, 1999. "Tax Subsidies And The Provision Of Health Insurance In Small Firms," Working Papers mstabile-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  21. David Powell, 2019. "The Distortionary Effects of the Health Insurance Tax Exclusion," American Journal of Health Economics, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 428-464, Fall.
  22. Felder, Stefan, 2008. "To wait or to pay for medical treatment? Restraining ex-post moral hazard in health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 1418-1422, December.
  23. Ellis, Randall P. & Jiang, Shenyi & Manning, Willard G., 2015. "Optimal health insurance for multiple goods and time periods," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 89-106.
  24. Gripp, Sharon I. & Ford, Stephen A., 1997. "Health Insurance Coverage For Pennsylvania Dairy Farm Managers," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 26(2), pages 1-10, October.
  25. Ronald J. Vogel, 1984. "Health‐Care Competition: Introduction," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 3(2), pages 42-46, December.
  26. Ellis, Randall P. & Manning, Willard G., 2007. "Optimal health insurance for prevention and treatment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1128-1150, December.
  27. Gerard Russo, 1989. "Moral Hazard and Optimal Cigarette Taxation," Working Papers 198918, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  28. Cogan, John F. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Kessler, Daniel P., 2011. "The Effect of Tax Preferences on Health Spending," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 64(3), pages 795-816, September.
  29. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643, Elsevier.
  30. Cockx, Bart & Brasseur, Carine, 2003. "The demand for physician services: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 881-913, November.
  31. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 1996. "Health insurance: The tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 609-639, October.
  32. Kevin X. D. Huang & Gregory W. Huffman, 2010. "A Defense of the Current US Tax Treatment of Employer-Provided Medical Insurance," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1001, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  33. Richard Dusansky & Çağatay Koç, 2010. "Implications of the Interaction Between Insurance Choice and Medical Care Demand," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 129-144, March.
  34. Liqun Liu & Andrew Rettenmaier & Thomas Saving, 2011. "The welfare gain from replacing the health insurance tax exclusion with lump-sum tax credits," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 101-113, June.
  35. Jaspersen, Johannes G. & Richter, Andreas, 2015. "The wealth effects of premium subsidies on moral hazard in insurance markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 139-153.
  36. Wachenheim, William Arnold, 1993. "Employer health insurance provision, wages and labor supply," ISU General Staff Papers 1993010108000018167, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  37. Sang-Hyop Lee & Gerard Russo & Lawrence H. Nitz & Abdul Jabbar, 2005. "The Effect of Mandatory Employer-Sponsored Insurance (ESI) on Health Insurance Coverage and Labor Force Utilization in Hawaii: Evidence from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 1994-2004," Working Papers 200512, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  38. Robert P. Inman, 1993. "Presidential Leadership and the Reform of Fiscal Policy: Learning from Reagan's Role in TRA 86," NBER Working Papers 4395, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  39. Selden, Thomas M., 1999. "Premium subsidies for health insurance: excessive coverage vs. adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 709-725, December.
  40. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The economics of moral hazard revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 811-824, December.
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