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Health‐Care Competition: Introduction

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  • RONALD J. VOGEL

Abstract

Medicare expenditures increased 497 percent, federal medicaid expenditures 484 percent, and state and local medicaid expenditures 458 percent between 1970 and 1981. Private health‐insurance premiums increased 329 percent, while patient direct payments rose 214 percent.1 Although these results include quantity and price changes, Waldo and Gibson (1982) show that “price inflation has been a major factor in the increase in health‐care spending.” Moreover, health‐care expenditures exceeded 10 percent of GNP (10.5 percent) for the first time in 1982 (Office of the Secretary 1983); the comparable figure in 1960 was 5.3 percent of GNP. This rapid growth in price and quantity (“expenditures” or “costs”in the nontechnical literature) has raised a cry across the land for cost containment or increased competition in the health‐care sector. Curiously, when one searches for a definition of “competition” in the same nontechnical literature, it is not immediately obvious what the word means.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald J. Vogel, 1984. "Health‐Care Competition: Introduction," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 3(2), pages 42-46, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:3:y:1984:i:2:p:42-46
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1984.tb00795.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mitchell, Bridger M & Phelps, Charles E, 1976. "National Health Insurance: Some Costs and Effects of Mandated Employee Coverage," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(3), pages 553-571, June.
    2. Jack A. Meyer, 1983. "Market Reforms in Health Care," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 650816, September.
    3. Feldstein, Martin & Friedman, Bernard, 1977. "Tax subsidies, the rational demand for insurance and the health care crisis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 155-178, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Louis De Alessi, 1989. "The Effect of Institutions on the Choices of Consumers and Providers of Health Care," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 1(4), pages 427-458, October.

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