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Belief revision in games: forward and backward induction1

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Belief system foundations of backward induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 393-403, December.
  2. Guarino, Pierfrancesco & Tsakas, Elias, 2021. "Common priors under endogenous uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
  3. Andrés Perea & Elias Tsakas, 2019. "Limited focus in dynamic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 571-607, June.
  4. Parshuram Hotkar & Stephen M. Gilbert, 2021. "Supplier Encroachment in a Nonexclusive Reselling Channel," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5821-5837, September.
  5. Penta, Antonio, 2004. "Perfect Sequential Reciprocity and Dynamic Consistency," MPRA Paper 10261, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2007.
  6. V. K. Oikonomou & J. Jost, 2020. "Periodic Strategies II: Generalizations and Extensions," Papers 2005.12832, arXiv.org.
  7. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2001. "Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 425-435, November.
  8. Giacomo Bonanno, 2022. "Rational Play in Extensive-Form Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-20, October.
  9. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2003. "A syntactic characterization of perfect recall in extensive games," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 201-217, September.
  10. Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 86, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  11. Board, Oliver, 2004. "Dynamic interactive epistemology," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 49-80, October.
  12. Françoise Forges & József Sákovics, 2022. "Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 589-605, November.
  13. Asheim, Geir B., 2002. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 121-144, November.
  14. Oliver Board, 2002. "Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games," Working Paper 244, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2002.
  15. Tohme, Fernando, 2005. "Existence and definability of states of the world," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 81-100, January.
  16. Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 159, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  17. Arieli, Itai & Aumann, Robert J., 2015. "The logic of backward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 443-464.
  18. Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2006. "Epistemic foundations for backward induction: an overview," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  19. Oikonomou, V.K. & Jost, J, 2013. "Periodic strategies and rationalizability in perfect information 2-Player strategic form games," MPRA Paper 48117, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Rich, Patricia, 2015. "Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 102-114.
  21. Ryan O. Murphy & Amnon Rapoport & James E. Parco, 2004. "Population Learning of Cooperative Behavior in a Three-Person Centipede Game," Rationality and Society, , vol. 16(1), pages 91-120, February.
  22. Asheim, Geir B. & Sovik, Ylva, 2005. "Preference-based belief operators," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 61-82, July.
  23. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2013. "A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 31-43.
  24. Souza, Filipe & Rêgo, Leandro, 2012. "Mixed Equilibrium: When Burning Money is Rational," MPRA Paper 43410, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Brian Hill, 2022. "Updating confidence in beliefs," Post-Print hal-03503986, HAL.
  26. Graciela Kuechle, 2009. "What Happened To The Three‐Legged Centipede Game?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 562-585, July.
  27. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September.
  28. Hill, Brian, 2022. "Updating confidence in beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
  29. Asheim, Geir B. & Brunnschweiler, Thomas, 2023. "Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 503-514.
  30. Ferdinando Colombo, 2003. "The Game Take–or–Play: A Paradox of Rationality in Simultaneous Move Games," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 195-202, April.
  31. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2010. "Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 155-179, January.
  32. Stauber, Ronald, 2017. "Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 409-432.
  33. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "Proper consistency," Memorandum 31/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  34. V. K. Oikonomou & J. Jost, 2013. "Periodic Strategies: A New Solution Concept and an Algorithm for NonTrivial Strategic Form Games," Papers 1307.2035, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2018.
  35. Cyril Hédoin, 2016. "Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-17, November.
  36. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  37. Giacomo Bonanno, 2018. "Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 1001-1032, September.
  38. Ashton T. Sperry-Taylor, 2017. "Strategy Constrained by Cognitive Limits, and the Rationality of Belief-Revision Policies," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(1), pages 1-13, January.
  39. Bach, Christian W. & Heilmann, Conrad, 2009. "Agent connectedness and backward induction," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27000, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  40. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2014. "A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 221-241.
  41. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2002. "Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 356-391, October.
  42. Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2004. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Research Memorandum 032, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  43. Guarino, Pierfrancesco & Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022. "Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 559-585.
  44. Dominiak, Adam & Lee, Min Suk, 2017. "Coherent Dempster–Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 42-54.
  45. Perea, Andrés, 2008. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-26, July.
  46. Feinberg, Yossi, 2005. "Subjective reasoning--dynamic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 54-93, July.
  47. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
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