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Citations for "Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures"

by Ben-Porath, Elchanan

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  1. Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria As A Difficulty In Understanding Correlated Distributions," Economics Working Papers we057238, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  2. Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013. "A detail-free mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
  3. Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  4. Forges, Françoise, 2012. "Correlated equilibria and communication in games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/171, Paris Dauphine University.
  5. Izmalkov, Sergei & Lepinski, Matt & Micali, Silvio, 2011. "Perfect implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 121-140, January.
  6. Dino Gerardi & Roger B. Myerson, 2005. "Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1542, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Forges, Françoise & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/8159, Paris Dauphine University.
  8. Forgo, Ferenc & Fulop, Janos & Prill, Maria, 2005. "Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 160(1), pages 252-267, January.
  9. Forges, Françoise, 2010. "Communication in Bayesian games: Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5279, Paris Dauphine University.
  10. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Papers 017, Departmental Working Papers.
  11. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  12. Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.
  13. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
  14. Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 2007. "Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency," Discussion Papers 1444, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2010. "A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 189-193, May.
  16. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Debora Di Gioacchino, 2005. "Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination And Debt Management: A Two Stage Dynamic Analysis," Macroeconomics 0504024, EconWPA.
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