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Strategic argumentation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Li, Ming & Madarász, Kristóf, 2008. "When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 47-74, March.
  2. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  3. Eduardo Perez, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-03583828, HAL.
  4. Chan, Jimmy & Suen, Wing, 2009. "Media as watchdogs: The role of news media in electoral competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 799-814, October.
  5. Gong, Qiang & Yang, Huanxing, 2018. "Balance of opinions in expert panels," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 151-154.
  6. Khalmetski, Kiryl & Rockenbach, Bettina & Werner, Peter, 2017. "Evasive lying in strategic communication," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 59-72.
  7. Yifan Dai & Drew Fudenberg & Harry Pei, 2026. "Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure," Papers 2601.05914, arXiv.org.
  8. Benjamin Davies, 2022. "Why do experts give simple advice?," Papers 2209.11710, arXiv.org.
  9. Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin, 2015. "Timing Information Flows," Discussion Papers 2015-16, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  10. Gregor Martin, 2015. "To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 143-166, July.
  11. Péter Eső & Ádám Galambos, 2013. "Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 263-282, February.
  12. ,, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  13. Wioletta Dziuda & Ronen Gradwohl, 2015. "Achieving Cooperation under Privacy Concerns," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 142-173, August.
  14. Franaszek, Joanna, . "Kompetencje a rozumienie złożonych informacji," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2021(3).
  15. Georgy Egorov, 2015. "Single-Issue Campaigns and Multidimensional Politics," NBER Working Papers 21265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Joanna Franaszek, 2021. "When Competence Hurts: Revelation of Complex Information," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 5-23.
  17. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
  18. Georgy Lukyanov & Konstantin Shamruk & Tong Su & Ahmed Wakrim, 2025. "Public Communication with Externalities," Papers 2509.08850, arXiv.org.
  19. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
  20. Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence reading mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 375-397, October.
  21. Nemanja Antic & Harry Pei, 2026. "Selective Disclosure in Overlapping Generations," Papers 2602.09406, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
  22. Chen, Ying & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Effective persuasion," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1310, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  23. Dina Mayzlin & Yaniv Dover & Judith Chevalier, 2014. "Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(8), pages 2421-2455, August.
  24. Miura, Shintaro, 2014. "A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 55-68.
  25. Ispano, Alessandro, 2018. "Information acquisition and the value of bad news," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 165-173.
  26. Lukyanov, Georgy & Shamruk, Konstantin & Su, Tong & Wakrim, Ahmed, 2022. "Public communication with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 177-196.
  27. Rappoport, Daniel, 2025. "Evidence and skepticism in verifiable disclosure games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 20(4), November.
  28. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
  29. Khalmetski, Kiryl, 2019. "Evasion of guilt in expert advice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 296-310.
  30. Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin, 2018. "When to Drop a Bombshell," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(4), pages 2139-2172.
  31. Ricardo Alonso & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2025. "Competitive Capture of Public Opinion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(4), pages 1265-1297, July.
  32. Nika Haghtalab & Nicole Immorlica & Brendan Lucier & Markus Mobius & Divyarthi Mohan, 2022. "Communicating with Anecdotes," Papers 2205.13461, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
  33. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5umu4i0hei8jkbdr8rppdqcall is not listed on IDEAS
  34. Matthias Hunold & Johannes Muthers, 2011. "Resale Price Maintenance: Hurting Competitors, Consumers and Yourself," Working Papers 100, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
  35. Matthias Hunold & Johannes Muthers, 2017. "Resale price maintenance and manufacturer competition for retail services," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(1), pages 3-23, March.
  36. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Receiver's access fee for a single sender," Working Papers IES 2014/17, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised May 2014.
  37. Honryo, Takakazu, 2018. "Dynamic persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 36-58.
  38. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
  39. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
  40. Shaofei Jiang, 2019. "Disclosure Games with Large Evidence Spaces," Papers 1910.13633, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
  41. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2022. "Bad News Turned Good: Reversal under Censorship," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 506-560, May.
  42. Mehdi Shadmehr & Dan Bernhardt, 2015. "State Censorship," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 280-307, May.
  43. Ying Chen & Wojciech Olszewski, 2014. "Effective Persuasion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(2), pages 319-347, May.
  44. De Moragas, Antoni-Italo, 2022. "Disclosing decision makers’ private interests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
  45. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.
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