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Relative performance or team evaluation? Optimal contracts for other-regarding agents

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Raphaël Soubeyran, 2019. "Technology adoption and pro-social preferences," CEE-M Working Papers halshs-02291905, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
  2. Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2014. "Bonus pools and the informativeness principle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 180-191.
  3. Bartling, Björn & von Siemens, Ferdinand A., 2010. "The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 598-607, June.
  4. Kohei Daido & Takeshi Murooka, 2016. "Team Incentives and Reference‐Dependent Preferences," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 958-989, December.
  5. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Ori Haimanko, 2013. "Prizes Versus Wages With Envy And Pride," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 64(1), pages 98-121, March.
  6. Bierbrauer, Felix & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "Mechanism design and intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 557-603.
  7. Matthias Fahn & Hendrik Hakenes, 2019. "Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 1-32, November.
  8. Dalmia, Prateik & Filiz-Ozbay, Emel, 2021. "Your success is my motivation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 49-85.
  9. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018. "Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 16, pages 453-485, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  10. Bental, Benjamin & Kragl, Jenny, 2021. "Inequality and incentives with societal other-regarding preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 1298-1324.
  11. Xiaoshuai Fan & Qingye Wu & Ying‐Ju Chen & Christopher S. Tang, 2023. "The implications of pay transparency in the presence of over‐ and underconfident agents," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(7), pages 2304-2321, July.
  12. Gill, David & Stone, Rebecca, 2015. "Desert and inequity aversion in teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 42-54.
  13. Biao Luo & Chengyuan Wang & Tieshan Li, 2018. "Inequity-averse agents’ deserved concerns under the linear contract: a social network setting," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 268(1), pages 129-148, September.
  14. Kirill Chernomaz, 2012. "Inequity aversion in a model with moral hazard," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2500-2510.
  15. Delfgaauw, Josse & Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Verbeke, Willem, 2014. "Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay: A field experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 1-13.
  16. Huck, Steffen & Kübler, Dorothea & Weibull, Jörgen, 2012. "Social norms and economic incentives in firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 173-185.
  17. Shingo Ishiguro, 2011. "Fair Contracts," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-30, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
  18. Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver, 2012. "Inequality aversion and externalities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 111-117.
  19. Yingchao Zhang & Oliver Fabel & Christian Thomann, 2015. "Pay inequity effects on back-office employees’ job performances: the case of a large insurance firm," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(2), pages 421-439, June.
  20. Nikiforakis, Nikos & Oechssler, Jörg & Shah, Anwar, 2015. "Managerial bonuses, subordinates’ disobedience, and coercion," Working Papers 0589, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  21. Kragl, Jenny & Gogova, Martina, 2013. "Wage Bargaining when Workers Have Fairness Concerns," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79790, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  22. Koch, Simon & Weinschenk, Philipp, 2021. "Contract design with socially attentive preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 591-601.
  23. Shang, Xiaodan & Luo, Chuanjian & Wen, Qian, 2020. "Do Chinese executives reward for luck?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 318-325.
  24. Raphael Soubeyran, 2019. "Incentives, Pro-social Preferences and Discrimination," Working Papers 2019.04, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
  25. Robert Dur & Jan Tichem, 2012. "Social Relations and Relational Incentives," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-054/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  26. Roberto Sarkisian, 2021. "Optimal Incentives Schemes under Homo Moralis Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, March.
  27. Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018. "Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 230-249.
  28. Livio, Luca & De Chiara, Alessandro, 2019. "Friends or foes? Optimal incentives for reciprocal agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 245-278.
  29. Xiaoyang Long & Javad Nasiry, 2020. "Wage Transparency and Social Comparison in Sales Force Compensation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5290-5315, November.
  30. Golman, Russell & Bhatia, Sudeep, 2012. "Performance evaluation inflation and compression," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 534-543.
  31. Ho, Shirley J. & Tsai, Yi Hao, 2020. "Building friendship with Boss: Strategic prosocial behaviors in the agency model," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
  32. Weinschenk, Philipp, 2019. "Contract Design with Socially-Attentive Preferences," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203546, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  33. Marc Crummenerl & Tilmann Doll & Christian Koziol, 2015. "How to Pay Envious Managers – a Theoretical Analysis," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 21(4), pages 811-832, September.
  34. Nikiforakis, Nikos & Oechssler, Jörg & Shah, Anwar, 2019. "Managerial bonuses and subordinate mistreatment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 509-525.
  35. Bartling, Björn, 2012. "Multi-tasking and inequity aversion in the linear–exponential–normal moral hazard model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 523-525.
  36. Michael Krapp & Kai Sandner, 2016. "Impact of an equal pay norm on the optimal design of incentive contracts," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 301-338, April.
  37. Jenny Kragl, 2015. "Group versus Individual Performance Pay in Relational Employment Contracts when Workers are Envious," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 131-150, March.
  38. Kragl, Jenny & Bental, Benjamin, 2020. "Other-Regarding Preferences and Incentives in the Societal Context," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224547, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  39. Fleckinger, Pierre & Martimort, David & Roux, Nicolas, 2023. "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," TSE Working Papers 23-1421, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2024.
  40. Demougin, Dominique & Upton, Harvey, 2023. "Relative income concerns and the Easterlin Paradox: A theoretical framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
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