In this paper we present an axiomatic approach to characterize the optimal contracts, which we call gfair contracts, h in the general moral hazard model. The two main axioms we employ are incentive efficiency and no-envyness. The incentive efficiency requires that agents of organization select the Pareto efficient contracts among all possible incentive compatible contracts. No-envyness is equity requirement to ensure that each agent does not envy contracts of others in the same organization. We then show that, due to the tension between incentive efficiency and no-envyness, fair contracts have the very simple feature that risk averse agents are offered the fixed wage to choose only the least costly action.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2011|
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|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/e_HP/e_g_shiryo.html|
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