IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/buecrs/v77y2025i4p437-443.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Unilateral Envy, Pay Inversion, and the Cost of Age Diversity

Author

Listed:
  • Eiji Ohashi

Abstract

Research shows that older people are more likely to be envious of their younger peers than the other way around. I analyze how such unilateral envy affects optimal incentive contracts for young and old agents. I show that the optimal contracts can be characterized by pay inversion: The principal offers a higher expected wage to the young agent than to the old agent. Further, I show that the principal is generally worse off with unilaterally envious agents than with bilaterally envious ones. I discuss the implications of these findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Eiji Ohashi, 2025. "Unilateral Envy, Pay Inversion, and the Cost of Age Diversity," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(4), pages 437-443, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:77:y:2025:i:4:p:437-443
    DOI: 10.1111/boer.12496
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12496
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/boer.12496?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:77:y:2025:i:4:p:437-443. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0307-3378 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.