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Citations for "Ex post implementation"

by Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen

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  1. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2011. "Robust implementation in general mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-281, March.
  2. Eric Maskin, 2008. "Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design," Economics Working Papers 0086, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  3. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 142, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  4. Saran Rene & Tumennasan Norovsambuu, 2011. "Whose Opinion Counts? Political Processes and the Implementation Problem," Research Memorandum 019, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Ludovic Renou & Karl Schlag, 2008. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Economics Working Papers 1087, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  6. Beard, Rodney & Mallawaarachchi, Thilak, 2011. "Are international environmental agreements stable ex-post?," MPRA Paper 34303, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Barry O'Neill, 2006. "Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1560, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis, 2015. "An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 918-958.
  9. Hans Peters & Marc Schröder & Dries Vermeulen, 2015. "On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 287-307, September.
  10. Yu Chen & Zhenhua Wu, 2012. "Delegation Principle for Multi-agency Games under Ex Post Equilibrium," Caepr Working Papers 2012-008, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  11. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  12. repec:inu:caeprp:2012-008 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000556, UCLA Department of Economics.
  14. M. Yenmez, 2015. "Incentive compatible market design with applications," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 543-569, August.
  15. Saran, Rene & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013. "Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 72-84.
  16. Anil Arya & Joel Demski & Jonathan Glover & Pierre Liang, 2009. "Quasi-Robust Multiagent Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(5), pages 752-762, May.
  17. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  18. Ghossoub, Mario, 2010. "Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model," MPRA Paper 37630, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2012.
  19. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2010. "Information acquisition and full surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2282-2308, November.
  20. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2012. "Two-person ex post implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 435-440.
  21. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2014. "A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 63-68.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.