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Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation

  • Philippe Jehiel
  • Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn
  • Benny Moldovanu
  • William R. Zame

Posterior implementation is a weaker concept than ex-post implementation. It requires that agents' strategies are optimal against others' strategies, given the precise information made available by the mechanism. Whereas ex-post implementation is generically impossible, we show by example that this need not be the case for posterior implementation.

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 666156000000000556.

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Date of creation: 25 Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000556
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  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000593,
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000548, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Sushil Bikhchandani, 2004. "The Limits of Ex Post Implementation Revisited," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000514, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2008. "Ex post implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 527-566, July.
  5. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1987. "Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 69-94, January.
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