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Ex post self-implementation

Author

Listed:
  • Hideki Mizukami

    (Aoyama Gakuin University)

  • Takuma Wakayama

    (Ryukoku University)

Abstract

We consider the implementation problem under incomplete information and interdependent values. This paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a social choice function to be ex post self-implementable in general environments. A social choice function is ex post self-implementable if it is fully ex post implemented by the associated direct revelation mechanism. We introduce a new monotonicity condition called restricted monotonicity and show that this and ex post incentive compatibility are necessary and sufficient for ex post self-implementation.

Suggested Citation

  • Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2015. "Ex post self-implementation," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 357-367, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:3:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-014-0050-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0050-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 4, pages 153-194, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 5, pages 195-239, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Ex Post Implementation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 3, pages 97-152, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Matthew O. Jackson, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 757-775.
    6. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2012. "Two-person ex post implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 435-440.
    7. , & , & ,, 2007. "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
    8. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko, 2007. "Secure Implementation―Theory and Experiments―," Economic Review, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 58(2), pages 122-135, April.
    9. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar, 1986. "General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 109-127, April.
    10. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    11. Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2007. "Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 307-325, August.
    12. K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2017. "New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 76-78.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ex post implementation; Self-implementation; The direct mechanism; Ex post incentive compatibility; Restricted monotonicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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