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Two-person ex post implementation

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  • Ohashi, Yoshihiro

Abstract

This paper investigates the ex post implementation of a social choice set with two agents. A social choice set F is ex post implementable with two agents if F satisfies the conditions of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity (EM) in an environment that is economic and has a bad outcome. Furthermore, if F is a social choice function, (EPIC), (EM), and an economic environment are sufficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2012. "Two-person ex post implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 435-440.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:435-440
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Ex Post Implementation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 3, pages 97-152, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1990. "Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 453-475.
    3. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2015. "Ex post self-implementation," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 357-367, October.
    2. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2014. "A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 63-68.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Implementation; Ex post equilibrium; Two-person;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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