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Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design

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  • Eric Maskin

    () (Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science)

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  • Eric Maskin, 2008. "Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design," Economics Working Papers 0086, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0086
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    File URL: http://www.sss.ias.edu/publications/papers/econpaper86.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    2. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, FundaciĆ³n SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
    3. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2008. "Ex post implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 527-566, July.
    4. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-1257, November.
    5. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    6. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier.
    7. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
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    Keywords

    Nash; mechanism design;

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