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Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Huck Steffen & Sarin Rajiv, 2004. "Players With Limited Memory," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-27, September.
  2. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2009. "Random matching in adaptive dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 98-114, May.
  3. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2022. "Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 321-352, August.
  4. H Peyton Young, 2014. "The Evolution of Social Norms," Economics Series Working Papers 726, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Terracol, Antoine & Vaksmann, Jonathan, 2009. "Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 54-71, May.
  6. Kyle Hyndman & Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Learning and sophistication in coordination games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(4), pages 450-472, December.
  7. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
  8. Bayer, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald, 2021. "Farsighted manipulation and exploitation in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
  9. Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, 2015. "History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 423-456.
  10. Aidas Masiliunas, 2016. "Inefficient Lock-in with Sophisticated and Myopic Players," AMSE Working Papers 1615, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 19 Apr 2016.
  11. Dürsch, Peter & Kolb, Albert & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2005. "Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 31/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  12. Thomas Norman, 2003. "The Evolution of Coordination under Inertia," Economics Papers 2003-W06, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  13. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2019. "Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-12.
  14. Fudenberg, Drew & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 100-120, January.
  15. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2020. "The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(2), pages 497-521, March.
  16. Andrew Mell, 2015. "Fooling Some of the People Some of the Time: Reputation Management and Optimal Betrayal," Economics Series Working Papers 770, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  17. Kimmo Berg & Harri Ehtamo, 2012. "Continuous learning methods in two-buyer pricing problem," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 75(3), pages 287-304, June.
  18. Nicola Campigotto, 2021. "Pairwise imitation and evolution of the social contract," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 1333-1354, September.
  19. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2009. "Rapid evolution under inertia," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 865-879, July.
  20. Burkhard Schipper, 2011. "Strategic Control of Myopic Best Reply in Repeated Games," Working Papers 284, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  21. Burkhard Schipper, 2015. "Strategic teaching and learning in games," Working Papers 151, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  22. David Jimenez-Gomez, 2021. "Social Pressure in Networks Induces Public Good Provision," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-17, January.
  23. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2019. "Dynamic Exploitation of Myopic Best Response," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 1143-1167, December.
  24. He, Simin & Wu, Jiabin, 2020. "Compromise and coordination: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 216-233.
  25. Ioannou, Christos A. & Romero, Julian, 2014. "A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 178-203.
  26. Shota Fujishima, 2015. "The emergence of cooperation through leadership," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 17-36, February.
  27. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2016. "Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 1-36.
  28. Battalio,R. & Samuelson,L. & Huyck,J. van, 1998. "Risk dominance, payoff dominance and probabilistic choice learning," Working papers 2, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  29. Sarin, Rajiv, 2000. "Decision Rules with Bounded Memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 151-160, January.
  30. Peter Duersch & Albert Kolb & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2010. "Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(3), pages 407-430, June.
  31. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck-Hua & Chong, Juin-Kuan, 2002. "Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 137-188, May.
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