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The Disadvantage of Tying Their Hands: On the Political Economy of Policy Commitments

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Cited by:

  1. Carsten Hefeker, 2019. "Political polarization, term length and too much delegation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 50-69, March.
  2. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  3. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
  4. Gilles Saint‐Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2016. "A Theory of Political Entrenchment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(593), pages 1238-1263, June.
  5. Juan Carlos Berganza, 1999. "Is it Welfare Improving to Insulate Monetary Policy from the Political Arena?," Working Papers wp1999_9902, CEMFI.
  6. Amy Pond, 2021. "Biased politicians and independent agencies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(3), pages 279-299, July.
  7. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto Stein, 2010. "Veto Players and Policy Trade-Offs- An Intertemporal Approach to Study the Effects of Political Institutions on Policy," Research Department Publications 4660, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  8. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  9. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1995. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 1-31, March.
  10. Ralph Setzer, 2005. "The Political Economy of Fixed Exchange Rates: A Survival Analysis," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 265/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
  11. Pani, Marco & Perroni, Carlo, 1999. "Time-Inconsistent Candidates vs. Time-Inconsistent Voters : Imperfect Policy Commitment in Political Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 544, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  12. Gilles Saint‐Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2021. "Engineering crises: Favoritism and strategic fiscal indiscipline," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 583-610, November.
  13. Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar, 2009. "A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 786-798, October.
  14. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Minne, Geoffrey, 2014. "Mark my words: Information and the fear of declaring an exchange rate regime," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 244-261.
  15. Matthias Wrede, 2019. "The incumbent’s preference for imperfect commitment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 285-300, September.
  16. Cermeño, Rodolfo & Grier, Robin & Grier, Kevin, 2010. "Elections, exchange rates and reform in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 166-174, July.
  17. Pierre‐Guillaume Méon, 2004. "Why are realignments postponed? A model of exchange rate revisions with opportunistic governments," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 72(3), pages 298-316, June.
  18. lahlou, kamal, 2017. "Conduite de la politique budgétaire: enseignements des expériences internationales et évidences des fonctions de réaction [Fiscal policy in Morocco: lessons from international experiences and evide," MPRA Paper 98023, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Maxime Menuet & Hugo Oriola & Patrick Villieu, 2021. "Do Conservative Central Bankers Weaken the Chances of Conservative Politicians?," Working Papers hal-03479411, HAL.
  20. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  21. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Geoffrey Minne, 2014. "Mark my Words: Information and the Fear of Declaring one’s Exchange Rate Regime," Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 107, pages 244-261, March.
  22. McBride, Michael, 2005. "Crises, reforms, and regime persistence in sub-Saharan Africa," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 688-707, September.
  23. Juan Carlos Berganza, 1998. "Relationships Between Politicians and Voters Through Elections: A Review Essay," Working Papers wp1998_9809, CEMFI.
  24. Pani, Marco & Perroni, Carlo, 2018. "Energy subsidies and policy commitment in political equilibrium," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 149-160.
  25. Guerriero, Carmine, 2006. "Endogenous Price Mechanisms, Capture and Accountability Rules: Theory and Evidence," Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance Working Papers 12197, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  26. Berdiev, Aziz N. & Kim, Yoonbai & Chang, Chun Ping, 2012. "The political economy of exchange rate regimes in developed and developing countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 38-53.
  27. Bodea, Cristina, 2015. "Fixed exchange rates with escape clauses: The political determinants of the European Monetary System realignments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 25-40.
  28. Jonsson, Gunnar, 1997. "Monetary politics and unemployment persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 303-325, July.
  29. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  30. Gian Maria Milesi‐Ferretti, 1995. "Do Good Or Do Well? Public Debt Management In A Two‐Party Economy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 59-78, March.
  31. Burkovskaya, Anastasia, 2019. "Political economy behind central bank independence," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 1-1.
  32. Chun-Ping Chang & Chien-Chiang Lee, 2017. "The Effect of Government Ideology on an Exchange Rate Regime: Some International Evidence," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 788-834, April.
  33. Howell, William & Shepsle, Kenneth & Wolton, Stephane, 2020. "Executive Absolutism: A Model," MPRA Paper 98221, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  34. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "To Be or not to Be a Euro Country? The Behavioural Political Economics of Currency Unions," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1883, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  35. Sutter, Matthias, 2003. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: An Experimental Study on the Strategic Use of Deficits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 313-332, September.
  36. Maxime Menuet & Patrick Villieu, 2021. "Reputation and the “need for enemies”," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1049-1089, November.
  37. F. Andrew Hanssen, 2004. "Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 712-729, June.
  38. Bodea, Cristina, 2010. "The political economy of fixed exchange rate regimes: The experience of post-communist countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 248-264, June.
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