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Time-Inconsistent Candidates vs. Time-Inconsistent Voters: Imperfect Policy Commitment in Political Equilibrium

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  • Pani, Marco
  • Perroni, Carlo

Abstract

This paper examines whether policy commitment mechanisms, when available, will be used by the elected policymaker in a political-economy equilibrium. We describe a twoperiod repeated voting model where second-period outcomes depend on commitment choices made by an elected policymaker in the ¯rst period, and where elected candidates may choose to deviate from their preferred level of commitment, retaining discretionary control of policy variables, in order to secure a favourable second-period political outcome. The implications of different political tenure systems for the candidates who are elected, the policy targets that are selected, the degree of commitment to their implementation, and the policies that are actually implemented in the model are examined.

Suggested Citation

  • Pani, Marco & Perroni, Carlo, 1999. "Time-Inconsistent Candidates vs. Time-Inconsistent Voters: Imperfect Policy Commitment in Political Equilibrium," Economic Research Papers 269295, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269295
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269295
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1996. "In or out?: Centralization by majority vote," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 43-60, January.
    2. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    3. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-156, March.
    4. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    5. Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 1995. "The Disadvantage of Tying Their Hands: On the Political Economy of Policy Commitments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(433), pages 1381-1402, November.
    6. Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria & Spolaore, Enrico, 1994. "How cynical can an incumbent be? Strategic policy in a model of government spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 121-140, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Wrede, 2019. "The incumbent’s preference for imperfect commitment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 285-300, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agricultural and Food Policy; Political Economy;

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics

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