Time-Inconsistent Candidates vs. Time-Inconsistent Voters : Imperfect Policy Commitment in Political Equilibrium
This paper examines whether policy commitment mechanisms, when available, will be used by the elected policymaker in a political-economy equilibrium. We describe a two period repeated voting model where second-period outcomes depend on commitment choices made by an elected policymaker in the first period, and where elected candidates may choose to deviate from their preferred level of commitment, retaining discretionary control of policy variables, in order to secure a favourable second-period political outcome. The implications of different political tenure systems for the candidates who are elected, the policy targets that are selected, the degree of commitment to their implementation, and the policies that are actually implemented in the model are examined.
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- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March.
- Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1996.
"In or out?: Centralization by majority vote,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 43-60, January.
- Cremer, J. & Palfrey, T.R., 1994. "In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote," Papers 94.335, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas, 1994. "In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote," IDEI Working Papers 33, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., . "In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote," Working Papers 879, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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