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Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades

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Cited by:

  1. Kerry Liu, 2017. "The Effect of Private Benefits of Control on Minority Shareholders: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from State Ownership," International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research (IJBESAR), International Hellenic University (IHU), Kavala Campus, Greece (formerly Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Institute of Technology - EMaTTech), vol. 10(2), pages 26-34, June.
  2. Pérez-Soba, Inés & Martínez-Cañete, Ana R. & Márquez–de-la-Cruz, Elena, 2021. "Private benefits from control block trades in the Spanish stock exchange," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
  3. Massimiliano Celli, 2017. "Minority Discount for Reduced Powers in Negotiations of Non-Listed Minority Holdings: Evidence from European Countries," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 12(4), pages 1-23, March.
  4. Albuquerque, Rui & Schroth, Enrique, 2010. "Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 33-55, April.
  5. Mukherjee, Rahul, 2015. "Institutions, Corporate Governance and Capital Flows," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 338-359.
  6. Albuquerque, Rui & Schroth, Enrique, 2012. "The Value of Control and the Costs of Illiquidity," CEPR Discussion Papers 9090, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Pak Hung Au & Yuk‐Fai Fong & Jin Li, 2020. "Negotiated Block Trade And Rebuilding Of Trust," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(2), pages 901-939, May.
  8. Oğuzhan Karakas & Mahdi Mohseni, 2021. "Staggered Boards and the Value of Voting Rights [One share-one vote: The empirical evidence]," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(3), pages 513-550.
  9. Dong, Qi & Slovin, Myron B. & Sushka, Marie E., 2020. "Private equity exits after IPOs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
  10. Erkan, Asligul & Fainshmidt, Stav & Judge, William Q., 2016. "Variance decomposition of the country, industry, firm, and firm-year effects on dividend policy," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1309-1320.
  11. Taylor, Lucian A., 2013. "CEO wage dynamics: Estimates from a learning model," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 79-98.
  12. Breugem, Matthijs & Corvino, Raffaele, 2021. "Dynamic ownership and private benefits," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
  13. Victor DRAGOTA & Carmen LIPARA & Radu CIOBANU, 2013. "Agency Problems and Synergistic Effects in Romania: The Determinants of the Control Premium," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 63(2), pages 197-219, May.
  14. Erwan Morellec & Boris Nikolov & Norman Schürhoff, 2018. "Agency Conflicts around the World," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(11), pages 4232-4287.
  15. Sonia P. Jurfest & Ricardo D. Paredes & Julio Riutort, 2015. "Control Premium and Corporate Regulatory Changes: Theory and Evidence," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 53(3), pages 159-187, September.
  16. de La Bruslerie, Hubert, 2013. "Equal opportunity rule vs. market rule in transfer of control: How can private benefits help to provide an answer?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 88-107.
  17. Bakke, Tor-Erik & Gu, Tiantian, 2017. "Diversification and cash dynamics," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 580-601.
  18. Alex Edmans, 2014. "Blockholders and Corporate Governance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 23-50, December.
  19. Wang, Wenyu, 2018. "Bid anticipation, information revelation, and merger gains," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(2), pages 320-343.
  20. Dimopoulos, Theodosios & Sacchetto, Stefano, 2014. "Preemptive bidding, target resistance, and takeover premiums," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 444-470.
  21. Timothy A. Kruse & Kazunori Suzuki, 2016. "The impact of changes in Japanese tender offer regulations on bidder behavior and shareholder gains," Working Papers halshs-01643926, HAL.
  22. Poulsen, Thomas, 2011. "Private benefits in corporate control transactions," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 52-58, January.
  23. Strebulaev, Ilya A. & Whited, Toni M., 2012. "Dynamic Models and Structural Estimation in Corporate Finance," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 6(1–2), pages 1-163, November.
  24. Muravyev, Alexander & Berezinets, Irina & Ilina, Yulia, 2014. "The structure of corporate boards and private benefits of control: Evidence from the Russian stock exchange," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 247-261.
  25. Dong, Liping & Uchida, Konari & Hou, Xiaohong, 2014. "Block trade targets in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 188-201.
  26. Carlos González‐Aguado & Javier Suarez, 2015. "Interest Rates and Credit Risk," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(2-3), pages 445-480, March.
  27. Dong, Liping & Uchida, Konari & Hou, Xiaohong, 2020. "Are future capital gain opportunities important in the market for corporate control? Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  28. Basak, Suleyman & Chabakauri, Georgy & Yavuz, M., 2018. "Investor protection and asset prices," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118917, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  29. Schroth, Enrique & Albuquerque, Rui & Fos, Vyacheslav, 2020. "Value creation in Shareholder Activism: A Structural Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 14995, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  30. Berezinets Irina & Ilina Yulia & Muravyev Alexander, 2011. "Owners, Boards, Managers and the Private Benefits of Control: A Study of Dual Class Stock Firms in an Emerging Market," EERC Working Paper Series 11/12e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
  31. de La Bruslerie, Hubert, 2016. "Does debt curb controlling shareholders' private benefits? Modelling in a contingent claim framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 263-282.
  32. Ngo, Anh & Duong, Hong & Nguyen, Thanh & Nguyen, Liem, 2020. "The effects of ownership structure on dividend policy: Evidence from seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
  33. Edmans, Alex & Holderness, Clifford, 2016. "Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  34. Thomas Poulsen, 2013. "Corporate control and underinvestment," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(1), pages 131-155, February.
  35. Roger, Patrick & Schatt, Alain, 2016. "Idiosyncratic risk, private benefits, and the value of family firms," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(C), pages 235-245.
  36. Berezinets, Irina & Ilina, Yulia & Muravyev, Alexander, 2011. "CEO and Board Characteristics as Determinants of Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange," IZA Discussion Papers 6256, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  37. Wang, Wenyu & Wu, Yufeng, 2020. "Managerial control benefits and takeover market efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 857-878.
  38. Albuquerque, Rui & Fos, Vyacheslav & Schroth, Enrique, 2022. "Value creation in shareholder activism," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 153-178.
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