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Managerial control benefits and takeover market efficiency

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  • Wang, Wenyu
  • Wu, Yufeng

Abstract

How and to what extent do managerial control benefits shape the efficiency of the takeover market? We revisit this question by estimating both the dark and bright sides of managerial control benefits in an industry equilibrium model. On the dark side, managers’ private benefits of control distort firms’ takeover incentives and hinder the reallocation role of the takeover market. On the bright side, fear of a takeover induces underperforming managers to exert more effort and enhances the disciplinary role of the takeover market. Our estimates suggest that the bright-side effect increases the value created by an active takeover market by 21%, comparable in magnitude to the dark-side effect. It is also important to account for this bright-side effect in explaining certain features of the takeover market, including a low takeover-performance sensitivity.

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  • Wang, Wenyu & Wu, Yufeng, 2020. "Managerial control benefits and takeover market efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 857-878.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:136:y:2020:i:3:p:857-878
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.11.003
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mergers and acquisitions; Private benefits of control; Structural estimation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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