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Citations for "Ex Post Implementation"

by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

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  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2010. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000017, David K. Levine.
  2. Saran Rene & Tumennasan Norovsambuu, 2011. "Whose Opinion Counts? Political Processes and the Implementation Problem," Research Memorandum 019, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000556, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2012. "Two-person ex post implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 435-440.
  6. Beard, Rodney & Mallawaarachchi, Thilak, 2011. "Are international environmental agreements stable ex-post?," MPRA Paper 34303, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H., 2010. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 264-286, January.
  8. Hans Peters & Marc Schröder & Dries Vermeulen, 2015. "On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 287-307, September.
  9. Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "Auction Design without Commitment," Discussion Papers 44, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  10. Barry O'Neill, 2006. "Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1560, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  11. Ghossoub, Mario, 2010. "Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model," MPRA Paper 37630, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2012.
  12. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2014. "A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 63-68.
  13. Yu Chen & Zhenhua Wu, 2012. "Delegation Principle for Multi-agency Games under Ex Post Equilibrium," Caepr Working Papers 2012-008, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  14. Anil Arya & Joel Demski & Jonathan Glover & Pierre Liang, 2009. "Quasi-Robust Multiagent Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(5), pages 752-762, May.
  15. Eric Maskin, 2008. "Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design," Economics Working Papers 0086, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  16. M. Yenmez, 2015. "Incentive compatible market design with applications," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 543-569, August.
  17. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2010. "Information acquisition and full surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2282-2308, November.
  19. repec:inu:caeprp:2012-008 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis, 2015. "An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 918-958.
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