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Citations for "Ex Post Implementation"

by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

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  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001194, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Beard, Rodney & Mallawaarachchi, Thilak, 2011. "Are international environmental agreements stable ex-post?," MPRA Paper 34303, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1666, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Ghossoub, Mario, 2010. "Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model," MPRA Paper 37630, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2012.
  5. Ludovic Renou & Karl Schlag, 2008. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Economics Working Papers 1087, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  6. Yu Chen, 2012. "Centralization or Decentralization in Multi-Agency Contracting Games?," Caepr Working Papers 2012-008, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  7. Rene Saran & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2011. "Whose Opinion Counts? Political Processes and the Implementation Problem," Economics Working Papers 2011-06, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  8. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000556, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Hannu Vartiainen, 2013. "Auction Design Without Commitment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 316-342, 04.
  11. Eric Maskin, 2008. "Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design," Economics Working Papers 0086, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  12. Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis, 2015. "An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 918-958.
  13. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2012. "Two-person ex post implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 435-440.
  14. repec:inu:caeprp:2012008 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2010. "Information acquisition and full surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2282-2308, November.
  16. Barry O'Neill, 2006. "Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1560, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  17. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2014. "A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 63-68.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.