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Common Belief Foundations of Global Games

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Takashi Ui & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Incomplete Information Robustness," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 019, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
  2. Mostafa Beshkar & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2017. "Dispute Settlement with Second-Order Uncertainty: The Case of International Trade Disputes," CAEPR Working Papers 2017-010, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
  3. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2016. "Common belief foundations of global games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 826-848.
  4. Kets, Willemien, 2011. "Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 300-325, January.
  5. Kets, Willemien & Kager, Wouter & Sandroni, Alvaro, 2022. "The value of a coordination game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
  6. Canale, M. & Fagiano, L. & Milanese, M., 2009. "KiteGen: A revolution in wind energy generation," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 355-361.
  7. Anauati, María Victoria & Feld, Brian & Galiani, Sebastian & Torrens, Gustavo, 2016. "Collective action: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 36-55.
  8. Sonia Bhalotra & Irma Clots-Figueras & Lakshmi Iyer & Joseph Vecci, 2023. "Leader Identity and Coordination," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 175-189, January.
  9. Morris, Stephen & Shim, Ilhyock & Shin, Hyun Song, 2017. "Redemption risk and cash hoarding by asset managers," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 71-87.
  10. Dominik Grafenhofer & Wolfgang Kuhle, 2015. "Observing Each Other's Observations in a Bayesian Coordination Game," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_18, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  11. Sergei Izmalkov & Muhamet Yildiz, 2010. "Investor Sentiments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 21-38, February.
  12. Chanelle Duley & Prasanna Gai, 2020. "When the penny doesn't drop - Macroeconomic tail risk and currency crises," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 520, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
  13. Aviad Heifetz, 2019. "Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1277-1296, December.
  14. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Di Tillio Alfredo & Grillo Edoardo & Penta Antonio, 2011. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-40, March.
  15. Edmond, Chris, 2018. "Non-Laplacian beliefs in a global game with noisy signaling," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 297-312.
  16. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2016. "Illiquidity Component Of Credit Risk – The 2015 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(4), pages 1135-1148, November.
  17. Mathevet, Laurent, 2014. "Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 252-271.
  18. Dasgupta, Amil & Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2007. "Efficient dynamic coordination with individual learning," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24498, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  19. Morris, Stephen, 2014. "Coordination, timing and common knowledge," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 306-314.
  20. World Bank & Nicholas Institute, 2016. "Tuna Fisheries," World Bank Publications - Reports 28412, The World Bank Group.
  21. Stephen Morris & Ming Yang, 2016. "Coordination and Continuous Choice," Working Papers 087_2017, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  22. Chong Huang, 2011. "Coordination and Social Learning," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  23. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
  24. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs”," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 35-41, January.
  25. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination," NBER Working Papers 22297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Laurent Mathevet, 2010. "A contraction principle for finite global games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(3), pages 539-563, March.
  27. Francesco Bianchi & Sydney C. Ludvigson & Sai Ma, 2022. "Belief Distortions and Macroeconomic Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(7), pages 2269-2315, July.
  28. Dominik Grafenhofer & Wolfgang Kuhle, 2019. "Observing Actions in Bayesian Games," Papers 1904.10744, arXiv.org.
  29. Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi, 2020. "Generalized Belief Operator and Robustness in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 693-726, March.
  30. Stephen Morris & Ming Yang, 2016. "Coordination and the Relative Cost of Distinguishing Nearby States," Working Papers 079_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  31. Dominik Grafenhofer & Wolgang Kuhle, 2014. "Observing Each Other's Observations in the Electronic Mail Game," Papers 1501.00882, arXiv.org.
  32. Chen, Yi-Chun, 2012. "A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 587-597.
  33. Grafenhofer, Dominik & Kuhle, Wolfgang, 2016. "Observing each other’s observations in a Bayesian coordination game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 10-17.
  34. Dasgupta, Amil & Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2012. "Dynamic coordination with individual learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 83-101.
  35. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2016. "Illiquidity Component of Credit Risk," Working Papers 081_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  36. Chong Huang, 2011. "Defending Against Speculative Attacks: Reputation, Learning, and Coordination," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-039, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  37. Chanelle Duley & Prasanna Gai, 2023. "Macroeconomic tail risk, currency crises and the inter‐war gold standard," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(4), pages 1551-1582, November.
  38. Eccles, Peter & Wegner, Nora, 2017. "Scalable games: modelling games of incomplete information," Bank of England working papers 641, Bank of England.
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