IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/cla/levrem/122247000000001110.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Ex Post Implementation

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2007.
  2. Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H., 2010. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 264-286, January.
  3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  4. , & ,, 2012. "Implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  5. Philippe Jehiel & Morita Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "Posterior Implementation Versus Ex-Post Implementation," UCLA Economics Working Papers 838, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Rene Saran & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2011. "Whose Opinion Counts? Political Processes and the Implementation Problem," Economics Working Papers 2011-06, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
  7. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2012. "Two-person ex post implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 435-440.
  8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 5, pages 195-239, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  9. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2015. "Ex post self-implementation," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 357-367, October.
  10. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 142, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  11. Yu Chen & Zhenhua Wu, 2012. "Delegation Principle for Multi-agency Games under Ex Post Equilibrium," CAEPR Working Papers 2012-008, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
  12. Ghossoub, Mario, 2010. "Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model," MPRA Paper 37630, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2012.
  13. Barry O'Neill, 2006. "Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1560, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  14. Parikshit De & Manipushpak Mitra, 2017. "Incentives and justice for sequencing problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(2), pages 239-264, August.
  15. Anil Arya & Joel Demski & Jonathan Glover & Pierre Liang, 2009. "Quasi-Robust Multiagent Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(5), pages 752-762, May.
  16. Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis, 2015. "An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 918-958.
  17. Abbas Edalat & Samira Hossein Ghorban & Ali Ghoroghi, 2018. "Ex Post Nash Equilibrium in Linear Bayesian Games for Decision Making in Multi-Environments," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-24, October.
  18. Hans Peters & Marc Schröder & Dries Vermeulen, 2015. "On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 287-307, September.
  19. Beard, Rodney & Mallawaarachchi, Thilak, 2011. "Are international environmental agreements stable ex-post?," MPRA Paper 34303, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2014. "A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 63-68.
  21. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2010. "Information acquisition and full surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2282-2308, November.
  22. Hannu Vartiainen, 2013. "Auction Design Without Commitment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 316-342, April.
  23. Fragiadakis, Daniel E. & Troyan, Peter, 2019. "Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 232-252.
  24. Eric Maskin, 2008. "Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design," Economics Working Papers 0086, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  25. M. Yenmez, 2015. "Incentive compatible market design with applications," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 543-569, August.
  26. Hagiwara Makoto, 2023. "Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex-Post Equilibria with Private Values," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 23(2), pages 663-678, June.
  27. Saran, Rene & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013. "Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 72-84.
  28. repec:inu:caeprp:2012-008 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Altun, Ozan Altuğ & Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Implementation with a sympathizer," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 36-49.
  30. Jianxin Yi, 2021. "Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 279-288, September.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.